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ABSTRACT
Dynamic charging of electric vehicles (EVs) is a promising technology for
future electrified transportation. By installing wireless charging pads under
the roadbed, dynamic charging allows EVs to charge their batteries while
moving through magnetic induction between the wireless charging pad and
the receiving coil attached to the EV’s battery. A pre-requisite for dynamic
charging in practice is the support of cyber infrastructure and protocols. Al-
though many research efforts aim to increase the charging efficiency and re-
move the physical barriers of dynamic charging, protocols in the cyber space
that support dynamic charging is still lacking, especially protocols for digital
authentication and billing. Due to EV’s high mobility, location privacy is
also an important research issue. In this thesis we present three protocols:
FADEC, Portunes, and Janus, that together provide privacy-preserving au-
thentication and billing framework for dynamic charging of EVs. The proto-
cols are tailored towards the dynamic charging scenario to reduce real-time
computation and communication overhead, and uses modern cryptography
building blocks to preserve the EV’s location privacy. Simulation results
and implementations indicate that the presented protocols are efficient and
feasible for future dynamic charging applications.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Electric vehicles (EVs) have many benefits compared to conventional com-
bustion engine vehicles: they are very quiet, offer high torque, and most
notably they produce no tailpipe emissions. The major disadvantage of
EVs today is their limited range and their longer battery charging time
compared to conventional vehicles. The EV’s expensive battery constitutes
a large part of its price and makes it less competitive in the market. In these
aspects, recent advances in dynamic charging technology, which allows EVs
to charge their batteries while moving on the road, helps address some of
the major drawbacks of EVs.
Dynamic charging technology charges the EV’s battery through magnetic
induction: a charging section is a road segment with a sequence of wireless
charging pads installed under the roadbed, and as the EV moves along
the charging section, the magnetic induction between the roadbed charging
pad and the coils, attached to the EV’s battery, charges the EV’s battery.
By allowing EVs to charge while moving, dynamic charging alleviates the
problem of short driving range of today’s EVs. With enough coverage of
charging sections, dynamic charging also reduces the required battery size
of an EV and in turn reduces its price, which makes EVs more affordable to
customers.
Dynamic charging has attracted attention from both the industry [1] and
the research community [2, 3, 4]. Several research efforts have been going
on to bring dynamic charging to practice: Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL)
has demonstrated 6.6kW dynamic charging with 85% efficiency over 16 cm
air gap, and is currently integrating the dynamic charging technology into
Toyota RAV4 SUV [5]. The Online Electric Vehicle (OLEV) project in the
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) developed
Shaped Magnetic Field in Resonance (SMFIR) Technology that delivers
power wirelessly from roadbed charging pads to the battery of electric buses.
In 2013 two OLEV buses were deployed along a 15-mile inner-city route
in Gumi, Korea. The buses receive up to 100 kW power at 85% transfer
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of dynamic charging of electric vehicles [8]. The
EVs charge their batteries by moving along the left-most lane.
efficiency with a 20 cm air gap between the bus and the road surface [6].
The UK has also started testing dynamic charging for electric vehicles [7].
In Figure 1.1, we illustrate the concept of dynamic charging of an electric
vehicle.
Despite its many advantages, dynamic charging comes with its own lim-
itations. At the current stage, the charging efficiency is sensitive to many
physical parameters including the EV’s position, its movement speed, and
the air gap between the EV and the charging pad. The EV must be properly
aligned with the charging pad. The current prototypes of dynamic charg-
ing require the EV to move at constant speed (e.g., 30 km/h) in order to
achieve the desired charging efficiency. The maximum air gap supported
by most dynamic charging systems is around 15-20 cm. In the future, the
dynamic charging section is to be used by different types of EVs that have
different sizes, different air gaps between the EV’s receiving coil and the
charging pad, and move at different speeds. The dynamic charging system
must learn the EV’s parameters such as its speed and airgap, switch on each
individual charging pad just before the EV comes, adjust the power output
according to the incoming EV’s parameters, and switch off the charging
pad after the EV moves over. However, before the EV can send its param-
eters to the charging pads, the EV and the charging pads must properly
authenticate each other. Since the EV’s parameters may contain sensitive
information such as its current battery State-of-Charge (SoC), which can
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be used to infer the EV’s past trajectory, the EV must make sure that the
other communicating party is indeed a valid charging pad before disclosing
its charging parameters. Similarly, the charging pad must authenticate the
EV before switching on and charging; otherwise a malicious attacker may
send forged messages to charging pads and cause them to switch on while
there is no EV above them, which in turn causes energy waste and safety
concerns. Although many research efforts have been going on to improve
the charging efficiency and to loosen the restrictions of physical parame-
ters of dynamic charging, digital authentication is a less researched area for
dynamic charging of electric vehicles.
Billing is another important issue that is overlooked in the current research
of dynamic charging. In certain scenarios such as the Online Electric Vehicle
developed by KAIST, the dynamic charging is used only by electric buses,
and both the electric buses and the dynamic charging infrastructure are
operated by the same entity. However, future dynamic charging aims at
serving individual EVs, in which case correctly billing the individual EV
drivers for their use of dynamic charging service remains a challenge. Due
to the nature of dynamic charging that allows EV to charge its battery
while moving, billing for dynamic charging is more difficult than billing
for static charging. Today’s static charging service usually adopts a pay-
per-use billing model: the EV stops at the charging station to charge its
battery, at which time the driver could pay the charging station by cash or
credit card. In this thesis, we envision a subscription-based billing model
for dynamic charging that draws inspiration from today’s billing model for
cellular service. Similar to the cellular service billing model, where a mobile
phone user makes or receives calls at multiple location within cellular signal
coverage and pays a single monthly bill, the EV receives dynamic charging
service from various charging pad owners at different times and locations,
and a third party such as the utility could aggregate the EV’s charging
activities in a monthly bill. The EV will pay the utility for the dynamic
charging service it received during the past month, and the utility in turn
pays each charging pad owner accordingly. The subscription-based billing
model allows the utility to treat the EV and other appliances in a uniform
way, and also facilitates implementation of flexible pricing options, e.g., the
utility could apply discounts to the EV’s dynamic charging bill if the EV
has enrolled in the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) program that helps the utility to
reduce peak load.
What makes authentication and billing for dynamic charging more chal-
lenging is the concern for EV’s location privacy. In general, a privacy-
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preserving design should not allow an outside observer to learn or infer
useful information about the EV’s locations. One example that violates the
EV’s location privacy is the use of EV’s long-term public key for authen-
tication: if the EV always uses the same public key to authenticate with
other charging-related entities at different locations, any outside observer
can eavesdrop on the wireless communication channel and learn the tra-
jectory of the EV by tracking the use of the same public key. The billing
protocol must also preserve the EV’s location privacy. In particular, the
billing protocol should allow the utility to calculate each individual EV’s
total monthly bill without learning when and where the EV has been.
Figure 1.2: Illustration of the problems that FADEC, Portunes, and Janus
aim to solve respectively.
In this thesis we present our effort towards privacy-preserving authentica-
tion and billing for dynamic charging of electric vehicles. Our contribution
consists of three protocols: FADEC, Portunes, and Janus. In Figure 1.2 we
illustrate the problem space of each protocol. Below we briefly describe each
protocol. A more elaborated overview of our contributions can be found in
Chapter 3.
• FADEC is an efficient real-time authentication protocol that enables
EVs to authenticate with the utility through roadside units (RSUs).
FADEC uses lightweight symmetric cryptographic operations to en-
able efficient authentication between EVs and RSUs and between EVs
and the utility, and adopts a proactive key dissemination approach
to achieve seamless handoff authentication between the same EV and
different RSUs.
• Portunes is an efficient real-time privacy-preserving authentication
protocol that provides mutual authentication between EVs and charg-
ing pads. Portunes adopts a key pre-distribution approach to minimize
the computational cost of signature generation and verification during
the authentication between EV and charging pads.
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• Janus is a privacy-preserving billing protocol that allows utility to cor-
rectly calculate and bill the EV without learning the EV’s trajectories.
Janus uses modern cryptographic tools such as homomorphic encryp-
tion and blind signatures with attributes to ensure that the EV’s total
bill is calculated correctly without revealing when and where the EV
has charged its battery.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, we briefly intro-
duce the dynamic charging technology; in Chapter 3, we give a brief overview
of our contributions; in Chapter 4, we describe the FADEC protocol that
provides fast authentication between EV and the utility; in Chapter 5, we
describe the Portunes protocol that achieves efficient and privacy-preserving
authentication between EV and charging pads; in Chapter 6, we describe
the Janus protocol that enables privacy-preserving billing without revealing
the EV’s locations to the utility; we include discussions and related works
in the corresponding chapter of each protocol, and conclude the thesis in
Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
DYNAMIC CHARGING
2.1 Overview of Electric Vehicle Charging
Depending on how the EV is connected to the power grid, we can classify EV
charging as wired charging and wireless charging. Depending on whether
the EV is stationary or moving while charging, we can classify EV charging
as static charging and dynamic charging.
Static wired charging is the most widely used method of EV charging
at the moment. According to the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
standards [9], charging can be classified as AC charging and DC charging.
AC charging is slower and normally used for charging at residential places,
and can be further divided into AC Level 1 and AC Level 2 charging, where
AC Level 1 provides charging rate of 5 miles per hour (i.e., charging the
EV continuously for an hour will give the EV enough electricity to drive 5
miles) and AC Level 2 provides charging rate up to 60 miles per hour. DC
charging is usually used at fast charging station. DC Level 1 charging can
charge the battery up to 120 miles per hour, and DC Level 2 charging can
charge up to 300 miles per hour. In Table 2.1, we summarize the charging
categories according to the SAE standards.
Wireless charging allows the battery to be charged without attaching any
cable to the power source. Wireless charging is based on the following laws
of physics: (i) a closed circuit loop carrying a current generates a magnetic
field around the loop; and (ii) a coil intersecting a magnetic field generates a
voltage in the coil. The idea of using magnetic coupling to transfer electric-
Charging Level Setting Charging Rate
AC Level 1 Residential/Parking Lot 5 miles / hour
AC Level 2 Residential/Commercial 10 - 60 miles / hour
DC Level 1 Commercial 120 miles / hour
DC Level 2 Commercial 300 miles / hour
Table 2.1: Charging levels according to SAE standards [9]
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Figure 2.1: Plugless wireless charging system for Nissan Leaf showing the
wireless charging pad and the wall-mount control panel [10].
ity over an airgap was first introduced by Nikola Tesla about a century ago,
and is called inductive power transfer nowadays. Many small appliances
such as smart phone, smart watch, electronic toothbrush, etc. have already
adopted wireless charging, and static wireless charging for electric vehicles
are slowly becoming available to customers. For example, Plugless [10] pro-
vides wireless charging system for certain models of EVs including Nissan
Leaf, Chevrolet Volt, and Cadillac ELR, for a price between 1200 USD and
1900 USD depending on the EV model. In Figure 2.1, we show a picture
illustrating the Plugless wireless charging system for Nissan Leaf. The in-
stallation consists of a wall-mount control panel, a wireless charging pad on
the ground, and an adapter inside the vehicle.
2.2 Dynamic Charging
Dynamic wireless charging, or simply dynamic charging, takes static wireless
charging one step forward. It shares the same basic principle of inductive
power transfer as static wireless charging, but the wireless charging pads are
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of dynamic charging infrastructure that UK is
planning on testing [11].
installed under the roadbed covering a road segment of several kilometers,
and the EV can charge its battery wirelessly by moving over the charging
pads. In Figure 2.2, we illustrate a sample infrastructure model for dynamic
charging that UK is planning on testing [7].
We define a dynamic charging section to be a straight road segment un-
der which the wireless charging pads are installed. We assume a dynamic
charging section has a single lane with only one entry and one exit. To facili-
tate power management, each charging section is typically several kilometers
long. Within the charging section, short wireless charging pads (e.g., 40 cm
long) are placed consecutively under the roadbed, with tens of centimeters
between each other. In addition, each charging pad can be individually
switched on and off, independent of other charging pads. Ideally, the charg-
ing pad should switch on just before the EV moves above it, and should
switch off immediately after the EV moves away.
We assume the dynamic charging sections are operated by Pad Owners
(POs). The PO may either produce electricity, or may purchase electricity
from the utility. We assume that each dynamic charging section is owned by
exactly one PO, but a PO can own multiple dynamic charging sections, and
there can exist multiple POs operating different dynamic charging sections
in the same area.
We define a dynamic charging session to be the continuous time period
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starting from the moment that EV e starts charging its battery from a
dynamic charging section operated by PO p, until the moment that the EV
stops charging from the same charging section. During a single dynamic
charging session, the EV continuously charges its battery by moving over a
series of wireless charging pads in the dynamic charging section.
Figure 2.3: Illustration of Dynamic Charging Section and Dynamic
Charging Session.
In Figure 2.3 we illustrate the definition of dynamic charging section and
dynamic charging session.
2.3 Advantages, Limitations and Challenges of Dynamic
Charging
Dynamic charging has many advantages compared to other modes of charg-
ing. Today most EVs are used for short-range inner-city commutes, and for
longer distance trips the driver must carefully plan where to stop and charge
the EV to avoid running out of battery in the middle of the trip. The ability
to charge EVs while moving greatly reduces the driver’s anxiety about the
EV’s driving range as well as reduces the trip planning effort. Since the EV
can charge its battery on the road, dynamic charging also reduces the EV’s
battery size that is necessary for daily use. Since the battery constitutes a
large portion of the EV’s total cost, a reduced battery size would in turn
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reduce the cost of EV and make it more affordable and competitive in the
vehicle market.
However, dynamic charging comes with several limitations. Today’s most
advanced dynamic charging system can only achieve about 70-80% charging
efficiency of wired charging. The efficiency of dynamic charging is also af-
fected by many physical and environmental conditions, including the align-
ment of the EV with the charging pad, the size of the airgap (i.e., the
distance between the receiving coil attached to the EV’s battery and the
roadbed wireless charging pad), and the speed of the EV. The EV must be
properly aligned with the charging pad in order for dynamic charging to
happen. This means that dynamic charging is likely to lose efficiency when-
ever the EV is not moving along a straight lane, e.g., changing lanes, or
when the EV is not moving at constant speed. Compared to other modes of
charging, dynamic charging requires large investment of infrastructure since
the wireless charging pads need to be installed under the roadbed.
Dynamic charging also brings various unique challenges to the cyber in-
frastructure. A dynamic charging system intended to serve general EVs
must be able to charge different types of EVs with different battery types,
different sizes of airgap, desired voltage, etc. This requires proper digital
communication support so that the dynamic charging system can learn the
necessary parameters of the incoming EV. The dynamic charging system
must be able to properly identify and authenticate the EVs for billing pur-
pose, which is challenging due to EV’s high mobility and the requirement
to preserve EV’s location privacy.
We observe that the above challenges represent a knowledge gap between a
feasible dynamic charging system for general EVs and the current research
effort in dynamic charging. Today’s research effort of dynamic charging
mostly focuses on increasing the charging efficiency and removing/reducing
the limitations of dynamic charging (e.g., increasing the maximum speed
or the airgap allowed), while the challenges in the cyber space are mostly
ignored. For example, the OLEV system deployed in Korea ignores the vari-
ation of general EVs that may come with different battery types and other
physical parameters, and only focuses on special electric buses. In the OLEV
system, the charging infrastructure is deployed and operated by the same
entity that operates the electric buses, which means that no external billing
is required between the charging facility and the EVs. Since no vehicles
other than the OLEV electric buses are able to use the dynamic charging
system, digital authentication is not necessary either, as no other vehicle can
steal energy from the dynamic charging system. A future dynamic charging
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system intended for the general public would violate all the above assump-
tions: the system must consider the variation of EV’s charging parameters
such as desired voltage and airgap, and must be able to distinguish between
EVs and non-EVs as well as authenticate EVs and bill the correct customer.
2.4 Subscription-based Billing Model for Dynamic
Charging
Billing model is another important research issue for dynamic charging, and
impacts the designs of both the authentication and the billing protocols.
In this section, we describe a subscription-based billing model similar to
today’s cellular service, where the EV pays a single bill once every month
rather than making payments for each dynamic charging session individually.
Our model involves three types of entities: the utility, the EV, and the pad
owners. The pad owners are the ones that own and operate the dynamic
charging infrastructure. There can be many pad owners in the same region.
The billing model consists of two operations: fee negotiation and fee ag-
gregation. Fee negotiation happens prior to each dynamic charging session,
where the EV and the PO negotiate and agree on the charging fee that the
EV should pay for the coming dynamic charging session. Fee aggregation
happens only once at the end of each billing cycle, where the EV calculates
and submits to the utility its total fee that it should pay to the utility, and
the PO calculates and submits to the utility the total fee that it should
receive from the utility.
We illustrate our proposed billing model in Figure 2.4. EV 1 receives
dynamic charging only once from pad owner A, and the charging fee for that
charging session is $3. EV 2 is involved in one dynamic charging sessions
with PO A for $4, and another charging session with PO B for $5. From the
utility’s perspective, the total bill for EV 1 would be $3, and the total bill
for EV 2 would be $9 (= 4 + 5). Since PO A provided dynamic charging
to both EV 1 and EV 2, the total fee that the utility should pay to PO A is
$7 (= 3 + 4). PO B only provided dynamic charging to EV 2, and receives
$5 from the utility.
The advantage of the subscription-based billing model above is threefold:
(i) it allows the utility to have a holistic view of all the EV’s charging activ-
ities, including charging at home, at parking lots, at commercial charging
station, and dynamic charging on the road; (ii) it allows the utility to treat
the EV as part of the user’s home appliances; and (iii) it enables flexible
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of subscription-based billing model for dynamic
charging. The fees in light-colored boxes in the bottom row ($3, $4, $5) are
the result of fee negotiation. The fees in dark-colored boxes in the top row
($7, $3, $9, $5) are the result of fee aggregation.
pricing plan for the EVs. Having a holistic view of the EV’s charging activi-
ties allows the utility to better understand the charging demand and reduce
peak load, while the ability to treat EV as a special home appliance en-
ables flexibility in pricing plans. For instance, if the user chooses to join the
vehicle-to-grid (V2G) program that helps the utility to reduce peak load,
the utility could apply discounts to the EV’s dynamic charging bill. The
subscription-based billing model also enables flexible pricing plan similar to
the data plan model in today’s cellular service. For example, the EV could
purchase a plan of 1000 miles from the utility, and the EV can use dynamic
charging anywhere anytime to recharge its battery up to 1000 miles of total
driving distance.
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CHAPTER 3
OVERVIEW AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In the previous chapters we have introduced the dynamic charging technol-
ogy, discussed its advantages and limitations, and the necessary support of
cyber infrastructure and protocols. The thesis thus focuses on the following
statement:
Dynamic charging is the next-generation cyber-physical technol-
ogy for electrified transportation that requires new designs of
authentication and billing protocols to enable secure and privacy-
preserving communication and billing.
Figure 3.1: Framework Overview. The billing cycle contains one starting
period, one ending period, and many dynamic charging sessions in
between. The starting period is used for preparation work, e.g., the utility
issue anonymous credentials to the EVs that will be used later. During
each dynamic charging session, FADEC takes care of EV-Utility
authentication, Portunes takes care of EV-Charging Pad authentication,
and Janus generates cryptographic receipts for the charging fee. During
the ending period, Janus reconciles the total charging fees.
The contribution of this thesis consists in three major protocols: FADEC,
Portunes, and Janus. FADEC is a general V2I authentication protocol that
aims to provide seamless authentication between EV and a series of roadside
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units (RSUs). Portunes is a privacy-preserving authentication protocol that
allows EVs to authenticate with charging pads without revealing the EV’s
true identities to the charging pads. Janus is a privacy-preserving billing
protocol that allows the utility to calculate the EV’s monthly bill without
learning the EV’s locations. In Figure 3.1, we give an overview of the frame-
work and illustrate which part of the protocols is executed during different
time of the billing cycle. We give a brief overview of each protocol below.
• FADEC is a real-time authentication protocol that aims to provide
efficient authentication between EVs on the road and the utility. The
real-time authentication between EV and utility in turn enables se-
cure real-time communication, which can be useful for a variety of
scenarios, e.g., the EV can upload its battery statistics to the utility
for real-time diagnosis, and the utility can broadcast dynamic pricing
information to EVs on the road. FADEC assumes a setting where
the EVs communicate to the utility with the help of roadside units
(RSUs), which relay messages between the EV and the utility. The
major challenge that FADEC solves is the authentication handoff be-
tween RSUs when the EV exits the communication range of one RSU
and enters that of another. FADEC adopts a proactive key dissemi-
nation approach that provides seamless authentication handoff, thus
reducing the need to renegotiate session keys between EV and RSUs.
FADEC can be viewed as a general Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) au-
thentication protocol, and can be extended to various scenarios other
than dynamic charging.
• Portunes is a real-time authentication protocol designed specifically
for dynamic charging, and provides efficient authentication between
EVs and wireless charging pads. One challenge in the dynamic charg-
ing scenario is that the EV encounters charging pads very frequently
(e.g., every 30 ms), and the contact time between the EV and each
charging pad is short. In order to complete authentication within the
short contact time, the authentication protocol must use lightweight
cryptographic operations in real time. Portunes achieves this by adopt-
ing a key pre-distribution approach, where the computationally in-
tensive operations such as key generation are performed during the
night when most vehicles are parked, and pre-distributes authentica-
tion materials to the charging pads, which reduces the effort of real-
time key negotiation between EV and charging pads and thus achieves
fast lightweight real-time authentication.
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• Janus is a privacy-preserving billing protocol that provides a way
for the utility to calculate the EV’s monthly bill without learning its
whereabouts, thus preserving the driver’s location privacy. Janus uses
modern cryptographic building blocks to construct homomorphic pay-
ment tokens which the EV can use to prove to the utility that the
total sum of the bill is calculated correctly. By using single-use anony-
mous credentials, Janus also allows the utility to detect if an EV is
intentionally omitting one or multiple payment in the calculation of
the total bill. While there exist privacy-preserving billing protocols
for other transportation scenarios such as electronic toll pricing, pub-
lic transportation (trains, buses, etc.), and static charging of EVs, to
the best of our knowledge, Janus is the first billing protocol proposed
for dynamic charging.
15
CHAPTER 4
FADEC
There are many situations when the EV wants to communicate with the
utility during dynamic charging: the EV could report its battery usage and
the utility could use the reports to monitor the health of the charging pads
and to optimize their efficiency by setting parameters, such as pulse signals
and resonant frequency, in real time; the utility could also detect energy
theft by checking whether the collected reports sum up to the amount of
energy delivered. A natural candidate for EV to utility communication is
the Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC), which is a medium
range wireless technology developed for automotive use based on the IEEE
802.11p standard. In DSRC, roadside units (RSU) are deployed along the
road, and are connected to a private or public backbone network, which
allows them to communicate with the utility, e.g., through the Internet.
Each EV is equipped with an on-board unit, which it uses to communicate
with the RSUs, typically within a range of around 500 meters. Clearly,
EVs would have to authenticate with the RSUs to ensure they send their
reports to the right RSU (instead of to an attacker impersonating an RSU).
At the same time, the RSUs would have to authenticate messages received
from the EVs to be able to implement access control. Signing messages
and verifying signatures must be fast, since the RSUs would have to handle
the authentication of reports from many EVs. The authentication mech-
anism also needs to support mobility, because an EV could communicate
with the utility through different RSUs as it moves along a road. The EV
and the utility must also mutually authenticate each other. The EV must
make sure that the other communicating entity is indeed the utility before
sending messages that may contain sensitive information such as its battery
State-of-Charge (SoC), and the utility must also authenticate the EV to tell
legitimate messages from fake messages generated by a malicious attacker.
The IEEE 802.11p standard suggests the use of Elliptic Curve Digital Sig-
nature Algorithm (ECDSA) for authentication in vehicular networks. Re-
cent work [12] has shown, however, that using ECDSA it could take a sig-
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nificant amount of time to sign a message and to verify a signature, which
makes it susceptible to DoS attacks. To get around the computational over-
head of ECDSA, recent works proposed the use of one-time signature for
authentication [13, 14, 12]. However, one-time signature is not the ideal
solution in our scenario since it could incur non-trivial key generation and
signing overhead [13], requires delayed verification [14], or puts restrictions
on the content to be authenticated [12].
In this chapter, we describe Fast Authentication for Dynamic EV Charging
(FADEC) designed to support the communication between the EV and the
utility during dynamic charging. FADEC features fast message signing, fast
signature verification, fast hand-off authentication, and low communication
overhead. FADEC allows the EV to use the same key to authenticate with
a series of RSUs, so that the EV does not re-authenticate itself every time it
encounters a new RSU, without sacrificing security. Our simulations show
that FADEC is suitable for dynamic EV charging scenarios. Compared with
ECDSA, FADEC reduces the data delivery delay by up to 97% and improves
the delivery ratio by more than an order of magnitude.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we in-
troduce security background; in Section 4.2, we describe our system model
and assumptions; in Section 4.3, we describe the proposed authentication
solution; in Section 4.5, we present simulation results; in Section 4.7, we
review related work; and finally we conclude this chapter in Section 4.8.
4.1 Security Background
4.1.1 HMAC
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is an authentication
scheme that relies on a symmetric key k shared between the sender and the
receiver. When the sender wants to send a message M , he computes a hash
value HMAC(k,M) using the shared key k on the message M . Both M
and HMAC(k,M) are sent to the receiver. Upon receiving message M ′ and
its signature HMAC(k,M), the receiver can verify that M ′ = M , and the
message comes from the authentic sender, by recomputing HMAC(k,M ′)
and verifying that HMAC(k,M ′) = HMAC(k,M). HMAC authentica-
tion is fast, compared to public key-based authentication, and is able to
achieve 112-bit security strength with proper selection of keys and hash
functions [15].
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4.1.2 ECDSA
In Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), each communication party has a
public key P and a private key S. The public key is made known to everyone
while the private key should be known only to the owner. The sender signs
the message M using his private key S to produce a signature S(M), and
sends it with message M . The receiver, when receiving M ′, S(M), could
verify the authenticity of the message by computing P (S(M)) using the
public key P of the claimed sender and can verify that M ′ = P (S(M)).
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a DSA based
on elliptic curve cryptography. The IEEE 802.11p standard suggests the
use of ECDSA to authenticate vehicle safety messages. However, previous
work [12] has shown that ECDSA takes non-trivial time to sign and to verify
a signature, and is not suitable when there are lots of signatures to verify,
which is common in scenarios where many EVs send frequent reports. An-
other major drawback of ECDSA is its vulnerability to DoS attacks, where
the attacker could flood the network with many fake signatures, and the
recipient RSU will be busy verifying those fake signatures.
4.1.3 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHKE) allows two parties to establish a com-
mon secret. In its simplest form, Alice and Bob, engaging in Diffie-Hellman
key exchange, first agree on a common base g. Alice generates a secret x and
sends gx to Bob. Bob generates a secret y and sends gy to Alice. Both Alice
and Bob are now able to compute the common secret gxy = (gy)x = (gx)y.
The naive implementation of Diffie-Hellman does not let Alice and Bob
authenticate each other, and is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MitM) at-
tack. Implicitly Authenticated DHKE (IA-DHKE) defeats MitM attacks by
using digital signatures [16] or incorporating the public key of the intended
communicating parties in the shared secret [17]. As a result IA-DHKE does
not provide anonymity.
4.1.4 Just Fast Keying (JFK)
JFK [18] is a Diffie-Hellman based key exchange protocol. The goal of JFK
is to allow two communicating parties to establish a shared secret key even
when the communication media is insecure, i.e., the attacker could eavesdrop
on the communication channel. Compared to the original Diffie-Hellman key
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exchange protocol, JFK messages are digitally signed to prevent man-in-the-
middle attacks. The major advantage of JFK is that it is DoS-resistant and
protects the RSU from signature flooding attack where the attacker sends
lots of signatures for the RSU to verify so that it does not have time to
verify signatures from honest vehicles.
4.2 System Model
Our system consists of a wireless charging pad beneath a stretch of a road,
a set of RSUs along the stretch of road, the utility that provides power to
the pad, and the EVs.
4.2.1 Communication Infrastructure
We assume that each EV has a DSRC on-board unit, which it uses to com-
municate wirelessly with the RSUs. An EV could potentially turn off its
on-board unit in an attempt to charge the battery without being billed. One
way to discourage this is to place cameras at the beginning of the charging
section and take pictures of the EVs. An EV that refuses to communicate
to the RSUs can be identified and levied a fine. This provides an incentive
for the EVs to communicate with the RSUs and with the utility.
The RSUs and the utility are connected through a backbone network.
In order to communicate with the utility, the EV will send its messages
wirelessly to an RSU, which will then relay the EV’s messages to the utility.
If the utility wants to send a message back to the EV, it will send the
message to the RSU through the backbone network. The RSU will then
send the message wirelessly to the EV.
We assume that the EVs, the RSUs, and the utility all have their own
public/private keys for digital signature. We also assume a public/private
key pair that is shared by all RSUs, which allows an EV to verify that it
is indeed communicating with an RSU, although it does not know which
RSU it is. We assume a Certificate Authority (CA) that certifies all public
keys. In particular, an EV only needs to store the public key of the CA, and
can learn the authenticity of other public keys by verifying the correspond-
ing certificates. We assume that a secure connection has been established
between neighboring RSUs and between the utility and each RSU. FADEC
thus focuses on the authentication between the EVs and the RSUs, and
between the EVs and the utility. We assume that all EVs and all RSUs
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have similar limited computational resources to sign messages and to verify
signatures, while the utility has significantly more computational resources.
4.2.2 Attack Model
We assume that the attacker is computationally bounded and cannot forge
a HMAC or reverse a one-way hash. The attacker could compromise an
arbitrary number of EVs and RSUs, and obtain all their secrets including
the private keys and the established session keys, but cannot compromise
the CA nor the utility.
4.2.3 Objective
Our primary objective with FADEC is to allow the utility to verify the
integrity of messages sent by the EVs and the identity of the sender for
correct billing. Sole authentication of the EVs is, however, not enough.
Without further authentication, an attacker could impersonate an RSU or
the utility to capture messages containing sensitive information from EVs.
The attacker could also be a malicious EV trying to hide its identity or
pretending to be another EV in order to evade billing.
Thus, the considered scenario also requires that the EV authenticates
the identity of the utility, to ensure the real-time reports are delivered to
the proper utility. Since all messages between the EV and the utility are
relayed by RSUs, the EVs and the RSUs must also authenticate each other.
The authentication between the EVs and the RSUs is an important security
primitive for network operations such as access control, load balancing, and
accounting. Without such authentication, an attacker may flood the network
with junk data and evade punishment by claiming the identity of some other
EV. Authentication also ensures that the RSU will relay messages from the
utility office to the correct EV.
4.2.4 Design Goals
Based on the above considerations we formulate the following design goals
for FADEC.
• Fast Signing and Verification: since the EV both receives information
from the utility and sends reports to the utility, both message signing
and signature verification must be fast. Conventional approaches that
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Figure 4.1: Overview of FADEC.
reduce verification overhead at the cost of increased signing effort are
not suitable in our scenario.
• Fast Hand-off Authentication: when the EV is moving out of the range
of the current RSU, it must be able to quickly re-authenticate itself
with the next RSU so it can resume sending reports.
• Low Communication Overhead: the signature length must be short.
This requirement is motivated by the condition that an EV will most
likely generate many messages of small sizes, e.g., messages containing
charging parameters. Attaching a long signature to a short message
means high overhead and low effective spectrum utilization.
4.3 FADEC System Design
In FADEC an EV e maintains a symmetric session key Kre with the RSUs
and another symmetric session key Kue with the utility. The session keys
are established using JFK. Figure 4.1 illustrates the use of the keys. Before
sending a message m 1 to the utility, EV e first computes the signature
σue = HMAC(K
u
e ,m) on m using HMAC with key K
u
e , and the signature
σre = HMAC(K
r
e ,m
′) on m′ = (m,σue ), and sends (m′, σre) to the RSU. The
RSU verifies the signature σre , and then relays the message content m
′ =
(m,σue ) to the utility through the previously established secure channel.
The utility verifies the signature σue and then accepts the message m. In the
following section we describe how EV e establishes the two session keys Kre
and Kue .
1Note that FADEC does not aim to provide message confidentiality, and here m could
be either encrypted or in plain text. Designing a proper encryption algorithm for dynamic
EV charging is out of the scope of this chapter, although one could potentially use FADEC
to establish another session key between the EV and the utility and use AES encryption.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of key establishment, dissemination to neighbors
and discarding of unused keys.
4.3.1 Establishing Session Key Kre with the RSUs
The EV establishes its session key with the RSU using JFK [18]. As the
EV moves along the road, it constantly leaves the communication range of
the current RSU and enters the range of a new RSU. The na¨ıve approach
would be to require the EV to establish a new session key with every RSU
it encounters. However, as JFK involves digital signature computation and
takes multiple rounds of message exchanges, re-establishing a new session
key at every RSU would incur non-trivial computational cost to both the
EV and the RSU.
To avoid key re-establishment, once the key Kre between EV e and the
current RSU is established (using JFK), FADEC allows EV e to commu-
nicate with all the subsequent RSUs along the EV’s travel path using Kre .
FADEC achieves this by using a broadcast-and-discard approach for key dis-
semination, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. When RSU A first establishes key
Kre with EV e, it broadcasts the key to all its neighbor RSUs (in terms of
proximity along the road) through the backbone network. When a neighbor
RSU B receives Kre , it stores the key for tˆA→B seconds, where tˆA→B is the
estimated time required for an EV currently in range of RSU A to move
into the range of B. If EV e does not try to communicate with RSU B
using Kre within tˆA→B time then RSU B discards the key. Similarly, when
C receives Kre , it stores the key for tˆA→C seconds. In Figure 4.2, EV e is
moving towards C, and enters the range of C within tA→C < tˆA→C seconds.
If EV e communicates with RSU C using Kre , then C will broadcast K
r
e to
its neighbor RSUs, and will itself store the key for additional tˆC seconds,
where tˆC is the estimated time that EV e stays within the range of C. Note
that only the RSU currently associated with the EV will broadcast Kre to its
neighbor RSUs. This prevents flooding and helps keep the RSU key storage
small.
In practice, RSU B could precompute tˆA→B =
dmax
A→B
vmin
A→B
, where dmaxA→B is
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the maximum travel distance to enter the range of B from the range of A,
and vminA→B is the minimum speed of an EV, if such information is available.
Alternatively, the RSU may estimate tˆA→B based on measured times tA→B
to adapt to varying traffic conditions. tˆB can be obtained similarly.
To estimate the number of keys stored by an RSU, observe that an RSU
has a limited number of neighbor RSUs, and an RSU will disseminate only
keys of associated EVs to its neighbors. In steady state, the average number
of keys NA→B received by RSU B from RSU A can be expressed using
Little’s theorem as NA→B = λAtˆA→B, where λA is the EV arrival rate at
RSU A. The EV arrival rate λA is bounded, and can be computed using
results from traffic flow theory [19]. For example, consider that the distance
between RSU A and B is dA→B and the EVs travel at constant speed vA,
thus they get from RSU A to RSU B in time tA→B. If we denote the EV
density on the road by ρA (EVs/mile) then the arrival rate is λA = ρAvA [19].
Using αA→B = tˆA→BtA→B we obtain tˆA→B = αA→BdA→B/vA, and NA→B =
αA→BρAdA→B, which is proportional to the number of EVs between RSU
A and B and to the quality αA→B of the estimate. Our simulations show
that in a heavily loaded highway scenario an RSU needs to hold 100 - 140
keys on average. Probabilistic lower and upper bounds on the number of
keys stored can be obtained using Jensen’s inequality and the Edmundson-
Madansky inequality, respectively, and can be used for dimensioning the
RSU storage.
Compared with the mobility-prediction approach [20] for key distribution
in VANET which predicts the next RSU that the EV will encounter and
sends the key only to that RSU, the FADEC approach has two major ad-
vantages. First, FADEC does not need to predict the individual mobility of
each EV. For example, when there are multiple roads between RSU A and
B, FADEC can use the road that takes the longest time to travel to estimate
tA→B. Second, FADEC can tolerate the overestimation of tA→B and tB at
the price of increased storage requirement. Using the mobility-prediction
approach [20], if the prediction is not accurate and the EV does not move
towards the predicted next RSU, the EV has to run the key exchange proto-
col again to establish a new session key with the RSU, which could consume
several seconds of valuable contact time with the RSU.
4.3.2 Establishing Session Key Kue with the Utility
An EV establishes Kue using JFK, but only after it has established K
r
e with
the RSU. Since the EV cannot directly communicate with the utility, it has
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to send the JFK messages to an RSU, and the RSU will relay the messages
to the utility. Since the EV has already established Kre with the RSUs, it
will sign the JFK messages using Kre before sending them to the RSU, and
the RSU will verify the signature before relaying the messages. When the
utility replies, the RSU will also sign the reply using Kre , and then send it
to the EV.
4.3.3 Prioritizing Key Establishment Messages
When an EV is sending or receiving JFK messages to establish keys, other
EVs that have completed their key establishment might be sending appli-
cation messages (e.g., content delivery) at the same time. The application
message traffic can have a non-negligible impact on the key establishment
duration, as the RSU queue is likely to have many more application mes-
sages than JFK messages. Without careful design, the processing of JFK
messages could be delayed indefinitely in the RSU.
We solve this problem by having each RSU maintain two queues: a JFK
queue that stores only messages related to the JFK protocol, and a normal
data queue. An RSU prioritizes the processing of JFK messages, and will
start processing messages from the data queue only when the JFK queue is
empty. In this way, key establishment messages will not be delayed because
of application messages that have arrived earlier. In our implementation, the
JFK queue employs the First-In First-Out (FIFO) scheduling policy while
the data queue employs the Earliest Deadline First (EDF) policy.
4.4 Security Analysis
4.4.1 Replay Attack
The attacker could replay an EV’s message to an RSU to confuse the billing
system, or could replay an RSU’s message containing pricing information to
mislead nearby EVs. Replay attacks can be prevented by either including a
timestamp or a nounce in every message exchanged to ensure freshness.
4.4.2 DoS Attack
The attacker could flood an RSU with fake key establishment messages (DoS
against authentication) or with fake reports (DoS against reporting). In the
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first case, the DoS attack is mitigated by the use of DoS-resistant JFK as
the key exchange protocol. In the second case, since FADEC uses HMAC
authentication to ensure fast signature verification, the effectiveness of a
DoS attack is greatly reduced.
4.4.3 Bruteforce Attack
The attacker could launch a bruteforce attack by collecting messages and
corresponding signatures, and using bruteforce algorithm to recover the ses-
sion key. However, it is computationally infeasible to recover the session
key from a HMAC signature, no matter how many signatures signed by the
same key are exposed to the attacker. With more message-signature pairs,
the attacker has better chance to guess the correct session key. To limit
session key exposure, conventional approaches allow the EV to establish a
new session key with every RSU. However, if the EV sends data frequently,
the attacker might still be able to collect enough message-signature pairs of
the same session key. On the other hand, FADEC allows EV to decide when
to expire the current session key according to the amount of data signed us-
ing the key: if there are small number of messages signed using the current
session key, our key-dissemination approach allows the EV to continue using
the key with the next RSU; if the EV has signed a large number of messages
using the current session key, it can re-establish a new session key with the
current RSU.
4.4.4 Wireless Jamming
The attacker could also attempt to jam the wireless channel between EVs
and RSUs. If the attacker succeeds, not only would the FADEC authentica-
tion messages be blocked, but all wireless communication between EVs and
RSUs would be impossible. Wireless jamming is a general threat to wireless
communication and is out of our scope.
4.4.5 Compromising RSUs
The attacker could attempt to compromise one or multiple RSUs and obtain
the session key Kre shared between EV e and RSU. Since FADEC allows EV
e to use the same session keyKre with all RSUs, once the attacker obtains the
key Kre , he could pretend to be EV e and convince other RSUs to relay its
message to the utility. However, since the utility and the EV authenticate
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each other using another key Kue , the utility can easily recognize if the
message comes from the attacker, and can further inform the subsequent
RSUs that the session key Kre has been compromised. The next RSU then
expires the compromised key Kre , and re-negotiates a new session key with
the EV if necessary.
4.4.6 Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack
During the key establishment phase, MITM attack is impossible since JFK
messages are digitally signed, and the attacker cannot impersonate any party
establishing Kue or K
r
e . In particular, the attacker cannot tamper the key
establishment messages between EV e and the utility, even if the messages
are relayed by a compromised RSU controlled by the attacker. After Kue and
Kre are established, a compromised RSU cannot impersonate an EV since
Kue is only shared between the EV and the utility, and is not known by any
RSU.
4.4.7 Impersonation Attack
Since EV e and the utility authenticate each other using session key Kue
known only by the utility and EV e, the only way for the attacker to con-
vince EV e to accept a forged message from the utility is by compromising
the utility itself and obtaining Kue , which is impossible according to our at-
tack model. Similarly, the attacker can only impersonate EV e by actually
compromising the EV. Since Kue is not stored at any RSU, although the
attacker may be able to obtain session key Kre shared between EV e and
the RSUs by compromising RSUs, the attacker cannot forge any message
between the EV and the utility.
4.4.8 EV Misreporting
FADEC does not provide any semantic guarantee on the correctness of the
reports sent by EVs. Although an EV cannot pretend to be another EV, it
can still report less energy received than actual in order to reduce payment.
The detection of misreporting is out of our scope.
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4.5 Performance Evaluation
We simulate road traffic on a 4-lane single-direction straight road segment
of 3km, with a total of 5 RSUs deployed evenly along the road segment, at
distances 0.3, 0.9, 1.5, 2.1, and 2.7 km from the start of the road segment.
We use SUMO [21] to generate mobility traces from a congested traffic flow
with 7284 EV/hour where the vehicles travel at a maximum speed of 75
km/h (46.9 mph), which has been observed on I-10 westbound [22]. We use
the mobility trace of 300 EVs as they traverse the 3 km long road segment;
every EV starts from a randomly chosen lane, and the simulation stops when
all EVs have left the road segment. In order to evaluate the system in steady
state, we show results for EVs 100 to 199, i.e., we discard the results of the
first and the last 100 EVs.
We simulate a backbone connection between the utility and each RSU, and
between each pair of neighbor RSUs. The propagation delay between the
utility and each RSU is set to 100 ms, and the delay between neighbor RSUs
is set to 1 ms. We use the Veins [23] simulator to simulate IEEE 802.11p
MAC layer behavior. We use the default 802.11p settings from the Veins
simulator for both the RSU and the vehicles; the RSU can communicate with
vehicles within approximately 500 meters. For each pair of neighbor RSUs
A and B we set tˆA→B = 120 sec, and for each RSU A we set tˆA = 120 sec.
We evaluate FADEC in two scenarios with different assumptions on the
computational resource available to the EV and the RSU. In the resource
rich scenario, we assume the EV and the RSU have a strong CPU to sign
messages and to verify signatures; in this scenario the signing and verifica-
tion using digital signature both take 20 ms. In the resource constrained
scenario, the EV and the RSU hardware have less computational power; in
this scenario digitally signing a message and verifying a digital signature
both take 200 ms.
IEEE 1609.2 [24] requires ECDSA to use either NIST P-224 or P-256
elliptic curve. The resulting signature lengths are 448 bits and 512 bits
respectively. In our simulation we choose ECDSA with P-224 curve, which
generates shorter signatures. We use JFK with 2048-bit RSA field and 2048-
bit DH field to generate 224-bit session key, and HMAC-SHA-1 as the MAC
implementation to compare with ECDSA. Note that the message overhead
of JFK applies only once per EV, since an EV runs JFK only when it first
enters the charging section. Both HMAC-SHA-1 with 224-bit session key
and ECDSA with P-224 curve provide 112-bit security strength, which is
acceptable today [15].
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Figure 4.3: Key establishment duration of the first 100 EVs in the resource
constrained scenario with different RSU queue management strategies.
In all our simulations the EVs generate 1024 bits of information per sec-
ond. Unless otherwise noted, each EV sends a report to the utility every
5 seconds containing all information since the generation of the last report.
The deadline for each report is set to be 5 seconds after its creation time,
since after 5 seconds the EV will generate a new report.
4.5.1 Key Establishment
We first consider the time it takes for an EV to establish its keys. Recall that
an EV e first establishes Kre with the RSU, and then establishes K
u
e with the
utility. The successful establishment of Kue thus implies the establishment
of Kre .
A natural question is whether it is necessary to prioritize key establish-
ment message processing. As alternatives, we consider two solutions: (i) the
RSU maintains a single data queue for both EV reports and key establish-
ment messages and employs FIFO scheduling policy; (ii) the RSU maintains
a single data queue but applies the EDF scheduling policy. The deadline for
a key establishment message is set to 1 second.
In Figure 4.3 we show the distribution of the time it takes for an EV to
establish keys with both the RSU and the utility in the resource constrained
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scenario. We use results from the first 100 EVs to illustrate how the system
reaches its stable state. The results show that maintaining only one queue
for both key establishment messages and data messages does not guarantee
the success of key establishment for all EVs. Using a single FIFO queue, only
8% EVs finish their key establishment, and although using EDF scheduling
helps, still less than 30% of the EVs can complete their key establishments.
Prioritizing key establishment messages by maintaining a separate queue
for JFK greatly reduces the key establishment duration. Over 80% EVs
establish Kue within 1.7 seconds even in the resource constrained scenario.
In the worst case the key establishment takes 8.3 seconds. Note that an
EV performs key establishment only once, and uses the same Kre (K
u
e ) with
every RSU (the utility). The one-time cost of 8.3 second is small compared
to the time scale in a dynamic EV charging scenario (about 144 seconds in
our case). These results show that prioritization is essential for successful
key establishment in FADEC when computational resources are scarce.
4.5.2 Reporting Period
One point of uncertainty in terms of the communication needs for dynamic
charging is the reporting period. At one extreme, the EV could accumu-
late information and could send one large report containing all information
when leaving the charging pad; at the other extreme, the EV could send
reports very frequently, with each report containing only a small amount of
information. We therefore start with investigating how often an EV could
send reports to the utility with and without FADEC. We consider that the
EVs send periodic reports every t seconds, where t ranges from 5 to 9, and
a report is delivered successfully if it arrives at the utility within t seconds.
Each report contains all information generated by the EV since the last re-
port sent. With a large value of t the EVs send reports less often, but each
report is larger as it contains more information.
In the resource rich scenario, both FADEC and ECDSA achieve delivery
ratio close to 1. In Figure 4.4 we show the delivery ratio as a function of
the reporting period in the resource constrained scenario. The curves show
the delivery ratio of reports averaged across all EVs, and the error bars
indicate the 5th and the 95th percentiles. We can observe that FADEC
is almost insensitive to the reporting period and achieves a delivery ratio
close to 1. ECDSA, on the other hand, achieves a very low delivery ratio
when reports are sent frequently, even though EDF scheduling is used in the
RSU. The reason is that the RSU cannot perform the verification needed by
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Figure 4.4: Report delivery ratio under different reporting period in the
resource constrained scenario.
ECDSA at the rate at which reports arrive. As a result, the RSU data queue
keeps increasing, and earlier reports miss the deadline. The delivery ratio
of FADEC is not only higher, but it is also more stable across all EVs; the
5th and the 95th percentiles are close to the average, whereas the percentile
intervals for ECDSA are rather wide. In the following we use ECDSA with
EDF for comparison.
4.5.3 Reliability and Throughput
Achieving consistently high data throughput is important for dynamic EV
charging, since it allows the utility to obtain up-to-date information about
the EV status. In our scenario where all EVs send reports at the same
frequency, throughput is proportional to the delivery ratio.
In Figure 4.5 we show the distribution of the delivery ratio of reports
from each EV for the two scenarios. Using FADEC, most EVs are able to
achieve a delivery ratio close to 1 in both scenarios. Using ECDSA results in
lower delivery ratios, especially in the resource constrained scenario, where
only 57% of the reports are delivered successfully on average. The reason is
that ECDSA’s large signing and verification overhead makes the RSU data
queue grow quickly, and most reports miss their deadlines even using EDF
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scheduling.
4.5.4 Delay
In Figure 4.6 we plot the distribution of the delay of all reports that arrived
at the utility within their deadlines. This is an important metric for our
evaluation, since a shorter delay means the utility could receive reports
from the EV sooner and would thus have better knowledge of the current
charging profile of the EVs, and the instantaneous demand.
The delay includes the time taken by the EV to sign the report, the delay
due to 802.11p channel access and data transmission, the time taken by the
RSU to verify the signature, backbone network delay, and the time taken by
the utility to verify the signature. FADEC achieves almost the same delay
with an average of 0.117 second in both scenarios. By design, FADEC is in-
sensitive to the increased cost of digital signature operations in the resource
constrained scenario, since once the session keys are established, signing
a message or verifying a signature takes only one or two hash operations
according to HMAC. On the other hand, the average delay of ECDSA in
the resource rich scenario is 0.180 second, and increases to 4.805 seconds in
the resource constrained scenario. In the resource constrained scenario, the
time to sign a message and to verify a signature using ECDSA significantly
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increases. This greatly affects the delay of ECDSA.
4.6 Extending FADEC for Anonymous Reporting
Although FADEC enables efficient real-time reporting between EVs and the
utility, the design of FADEC as we have described so far does not fully
protect the EV’s location privacy. In particular, since the EV uses the same
session to authenticate with a series of RSUs, an observer can eavesdrop
on the wireless communication channel and track the EV’s positions by
following the use of the same session key. This problem can be mitigated by
having the EV periodically negotiate a new session key with the RSU. One
example design follow this approach is TACK [25], which divides the road
into segments. Within the same road segment the EV uses the same session
key, which provides short-term linkability; and the EV uses different session
keys at different road segments to achieve long-term unlinkability. Another
part of the FADEC design that compromises the EV’s location privacy is the
use of JFK as the key establishment protocol. JFK assumes the deployment
of PKI and uses the EV’s long-term public key for authentication. Thus,
although the EV could periodically re-negotiate a new session key, if JFK
is used for each key negotiation, an outside observer can still link the old
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session key and the new session key to the same EV by observing that the
same long-term public key is used in the JFK negotiations.
We observe that in many real-time reporting scenarios, the utility is only
interested in the aggregate result from many EVs’ reports rather than the
report concerning an individual EV’s identity. For example, the utility may
request EVs within a certain area to report their current battery State-of-
Charge (SoC) in order to predict the charging demand in the near future.
In this case, the utility is interested in questions such as how many EVs
within this area have battery SoC below 30%, instead of the current battery
SoC of a particular individual EV. From the perspective of authentication
and reporting, the utility only needs to verify that the reports are indeed
submitted by legitimate EVs (as opposed to forged by an attacker using
a laptop) but does not need to know the true identity of each particular
EV. In particular, the EV should main anonymous during the reporting
process. FADEC can be easily extended to enable anonymous reporting. In
its current design, the session key can be linked to the EV’s true identity
because FADEC uses JFK for key establishment, and JFK uses PKI-based
authentication which reveals the EV’s true identity. To enable anonymous
report, anonymous credentials [26, 27, 28] can be used to authenticate the
EV during the key establishment process: the EV spends an anonymous
credential and binds the anonymous credential to the key establishment
session (e.g., [29]) instead of using PKI-based authentication.
4.7 Related Work
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [30] is a popular solution for micro-mobility.
Whenever the EV changes its network location (e.g., moves into the range
of a new RSU), it sends an UPDATE message to notify the rendezvous
server about its new network location. Despite efforts [31] to reduce control
signaling and to simplify the update procedure, HIP-based approaches still
incur non-trivial handover latency. The proposed FADEC mechanism differs
from HIP-based approaches in that it incurs no handover latency: the next
associated RSU always obtains the session key before the EV enters its range,
and the EV continues to use the current session key with the next associated
RSU. Zhu et al. [20] suggest a prediction-based approach, where the current
RSU predicts the next RSU that the EV will encounter, and pre-establish a
session key between the EV and its next associated RSU. The drawback of
this approach is that the performance highly depends on the accuracy of EV
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mobility prediction. If the current RSU does not correctly predict the next
associated RSU, the EV itself would have to re-establish a new session key
with the next RSU. FADEC, on the other hand, does not predict individual
vehicle mobility, but only uses aggregate traffic statistics such as the average
speed of vehicles along a road segment, which can be easily obtained from
historical data.
In dense traffic area, an RSU would need to simultaneously verify pack-
ets from multiple vehicles. This motivates several batch authentication de-
signs [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40], where the packet is first batched
without verification, and the batch of packets is verified either periodically
or when the batch accumulates to a certain size. In this way, batch authen-
tication reduces the total computation overhead. However, since the packets
are not verified immediately, batch authentication may not be suitable for
real-time applications.
Authentication based on one-time signatures [14, 13, 41] has also been
considered in vehicular networks. Due to its fast and lightweight veri-
fication, one-time signature is particular attractive in broadcast scenar-
ios, e.g., an RSU broadcasting electricity price information to nearby EVs.
VAST [42] combined an improved version of TESLA one-time signature [14]
with ECDSA [43] to provide flexible and efficient authentication for vehicu-
lar network. Hsiao et al. [12] showed that one-time signatures can be further
optimized if the future content to be signed can be predicted.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented FADEC, authentication for dynamic elec-
tric vehicle charging. FADEC lets EVs establish symmetric keys with the
RSUs and the utility, and achieves fast signing, fast verification, fast hand-
off authentication, and low communication overhead. Our simulations have
shown that FADEC with EDF scheduling obtains very close to 1 report de-
livery ratio and small delay in both resource rich and constrained scenarios,
and is more suitable for dynamic electric vehicle charging than ECDSA. We
have also described how to extend FADEC to provide anonymous reporting
by using anonymous credentials to establish session keys.
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CHAPTER 5
PORTUNES
Dynamic charging requires communication between the EVs and the pads.
The EV needs to inform each wireless charging pad about its arrival just
in time for the pad to switch on, and about its charging parameters, such
as the desired charging rate, battery type, coil type, etc. In addition, the
EV and the charging pads must be able to verify the identity of each other
upon exchanging information in order to defeat any malicious attempt to
impersonate the EV or the charging pads.
Designing an authentication scheme for EVs to authenticate with charg-
ing pads is challenging. If the EV is moving at high speed (e.g., 100 km/h),
the contact time between the EV and a charging pad might be only tens
of milliseconds, and the authentication must complete within no more than
several milliseconds so that the rest of the contact window can be used to ac-
tually charge the EV. Since there are many short charging pads in a dynamic
charging section, dynamic charging requires high authentication frequency,
and thus the authentication protocol has to be fast and lightweight. Verify-
ing a digital signature could take tens of milliseconds [12] and is infeasible
in this scenario. One-time signature schemes [13, 14] that feature fast sig-
nature verification come at the cost of slow key generation or large key size,
and thus cannot achieve fast mutual authentication. Authentication based
on challenge-response [44] that requires multiple message exchanges is less
likely to succeed due to packet losses in vehicular networks [45].
In this chapter we describe Portunes, a privacy-preserving authentication
protocol that allows fast authentication between EVs and charging pads,
and provides location privacy through using pseudonyms. To strike the
right balance between computational cost and authentication security and
efficiency, Portunes adopts a key pre-distribution approach. Efficient key
pre-distribution is enabled by the heavy daily fluctuation of road traffic: a
road can be crowded during rush hour, but can be nearly empty during
night time. Portunes utilizes the periods when there is little road traffic to
generate and to pre-distribute session keys to the charging pads, so that an
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EV can obtain and use a session key with the charging pads even during
rush hours without having to dimension the communication capacity of the
charging pads for peak hours.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.1, we describe
the system model; in Section 5.2, we present the Portunes protocol; in Sec-
tion 5.3, we analyze various security and privacy aspects of Portunes; in
Section 5.4, we present evaluation results; in Section 5.5, we review related
work; and we conclude this chapter in Section 5.6.
5.1 Model and Assumptions
We consider a system that consists of utility, pad owners (PO) and electric
vehicles (EVs).
5.1.1 Physical Model
We assume charging pads are deployed sequentially under the roadbed in
the charging section. The length of the charging section could be in the
order of kilometers. We denote the length of a charging pad by λ, and the
distance between two charging pads by δ. A typical setup might be L = 4
km, λ = δ = 0.4 m. For clarity we assume the charging pads are numbered
1, 2, 3, . . ., and the EV always encounters the charging pads in ascending
order.
5.1.2 Communication Model
We assume that the utility and the PO are connected through a high speed
network. We make the reasonable assumption that the PO will communicate
with its charging pads via power-line communication (PLC), as this keeps
the roadbed infrastructure simple. PLC is able to meet the bandwidth
requirement since periods of low traffic typically last for several hours, during
which time the PO can transmit key materials for the next day to each
charging pad. We also assume that each charging pad is able to communicate
with its predecessor and successor charging pads through PLC. Finally, each
EV can communicate with the utility either via the cellular network or via
WiFi through roadside units (RSU).
For EV to charging pad communication, we consider that there is a ded-
icated short range wireless communication device installed at the bottom
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of the EVs; we denote its vertical distance from the ground by h. A cor-
responding short range wireless communication device is installed at the
beginning of each pad. We denote the range of the wireless device by r, and
denote the communication contact time between the EV and a pad, which
is defined as the duration when the EV and the pad can communicate with
each other, by T .
A typical setup might be r = 0.5 m, and h = 0.3 m. Note that in this case
the wireless devices at two neighboring pads are separated by λ + δ = 0.8
m, and at most one charging pad will receive the transmitted signal from an
EV. Due to the short communication range, a pad is also unlikely to receive
the beacon from an EV moving at another lane. If the EV is moving at speed
v = 108 km/s then the communication contact time T = (2
√
r2−h2
v =)20 ms.
5.1.3 Time and Location Information
We assume that the utility, the PO, each EV, and each charging pad all have
a clock with time accuracy no worse than 200 ms. An EV can synchronize
its clock with either GPS satellite if it has on-board GPS device, or with an
Internet time server through WiFi or cellular connection. Most Real Time
Clocks (RTC) commonly used in electronic devices today can achieve an
accuracy of around 100 ppm (1 parts-per-million (ppm) = 10−6), and an
EV using such RTC only needs to synchronize its clock every ( 200 ms100 ppm =)
33 mins. Each charging pad p synchronizes with the PO’s clock using some
network clock synchronization algorithm (e.g., [46]), and learns its GPS
coordinates lp from the PO.
5.1.4 Billing Model
Portunes is designed for the subscription-based billing model introduced in
Section 2.4. We refer the reader to Section 2.4 for a detailed description of
the billing model.
5.1.5 Security and Attack Model
We assume deployment of a PKI. The utilities, the POs, and each EV have
a pair of public and private keys. Each utility knows the subscribing EVs’
public keys, and each EV also knows its utility’s public key. The utilities
know the public keys of the POs and vice-versa. In addition, a PO P shares
two symmetric keys KEP,p,K
A
P,p with each of its charging pads p. Each utility
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C also shares a one-way function fC,P with each PO P (and its charging
pads).
We assume the attacker can eavesdrop on the wireless communication be-
tween the EV and the infrastructure such as the utility, the PO, and the
charging pads. In particular, the attacker could capture the message sent by
an EV and replay the message somewhere else. We assume the attacker is
computationally bounded, i.e., the attacker cannot reverse a one-way func-
tion or crack an AES encryption using brute force, and that the attacker
cannot compromise the utility, the pad owner, or any charging pad and ob-
tain their secret keys. Portunes focuses on defending against impersonation
attacks, where the attacker pretends to be the EV, the charging pads, the
PO, or even the utility in order to benefit. One example is that the attacker,
who charges his own EV using dynamic charging, pretends to be another
EV to evade payment.
In Table 5.1 we summarize the notations used in the chapter. To simplify
notations, we use f and K to denote fC,P and KC,P respectively when C
and P are clear from the context.
5.2 Portunes
Portunes aims to provide simple, robust, scalable, and privacy-preserving
authentication, but not to optimize the charging process itself. Operational
and control issues such as choosing the optimal charging rate, scheduling
when to switch on and off each charging pad, accounting for inefficient charg-
ing when the charging coils are not properly aligned (e.g., when the EV is
switching lanes), are beyond our scope.
Portunes consists of two phases: key pre-distribution and authentication.
In the key pre-distribution phase, the utilities generate the key sets and send
them to the POs, which in turn disseminate the key sets to each charging
pad. In the authentication step, the utilities allocate keys and pseudonyms
to EVs before they enter the charging section, and the EVs authenticate with
each charging pad encountered using the assigned key. The true identity of
the EV is not revealed to the charging pads during the authentication.
In Figure 5.1 we show the message exchange. Note that msg 2 is between
the PO and each charging pad, and msg 5 and msg 6 are between the EV
and each charging pad.
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Ie the permanent identity of EV e.
π pseudonym assigned by the utility to an EV.
Π the set of all pseudonyms.
fC,P collision-free one-way function
(or f) shared between utility C and PO P .
KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi) session keys assigned by the utility
to EV with pseudonym π.
EtMK
A
KE Encrypt-then-MAC with
encryption key KE and MAC key KA.
KC,P the key set {(π,Kf(pi)) : π ∈ Π} of all
(or K) index-key pairs sent by utility C to PO P .
KEP,p,K
A
P,p symmetric keys shared between pad p and PO P .
K(m) AES encryption of message m using symmetric key K.
{m}A→B sign the message m using A’s privacy key, then
encrypt m and the signature using B’s public key
tA timestamp generated by A.
lˆe(t) the estimated location of EV e at time t.
le(t) the true location of EV e at time t.
lp the true location of charging pad p
ǫl acceptable error in the location stamp.
ǫt acceptable error in the time stamp.
r communication range of the wireless devices installed
at the bottom of each EV and at the start of each pad.
h vertical distance from the wireless device at the bottom
of the EV to the ground.
Table 5.1: Notations
5.2.1 Key Pre-distribution Phase
The key pre-distribution phase occurs every night, when there is little road
traffic. Utility C generates the pseudonym set Π and the corresponding
indexed key set
K = {(f(π),KEf(pi),KAf(pi)) : π ∈ Π} (5.1)
using a collision-free one-way function f , where KEf(pi) is for message encryp-
tion/decryption and KAf(pi) is for MAC computation. f is one-way in that it
is infeasible to compute π given f(π). Since we assume the pseudonym set
Π and the key set K are generated daily, the size of Π and K depends on
the daily traffic volume at the charging section 1. For each π ∈ Π, utility C
1The annual average daily traffic (AADT) of highly congested road is generally in the
order of hundreds of thousands cars. This implies that in the extreme case where every
EV in a congested road requires dynamic charging, the size of Π is at most some hundreds
of thousands.
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Figure 5.1: Portunes protocol overview with utility C, EV e, pad-owner P
and charging pad p. Messages 1 to 6 are specified in equations (1)-(6),
respectively.
sends
msg 1 : {f(π),KEf(pi),KAf(pi), tC}C→P (5.2)
to the PO, where tC is a timestamp generated by C. Note that msg 1 is
signed by C’s private key to ensure its authenticity, and encrypted using P ’s
public key so that only P can decrypt the message (using its private key).
When receiving msg 1, the PO disseminates the learned index-key tuples
(f(π),KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi)) to the charging pads by sending the message
msg 2 : EtM
KA
P,p
KE
P,p
(f(π),Kf(pi), tP ) (5.3)
to each pad p, where tP is the current timestamp generated by the PO. This
message is first encrypted with key KEP,p, and the MAC on the ciphertext
is computed with key KAP,p. In the end, each charging pad learns the entire
key set K.
5.2.2 Authentication with Utility and Charging Pads
Upon entering a charging section, EV e authenticates with utility C to
obtain a pseudonym π and the session keys KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi). As the EV moves
within the charging section, it uses π and the session keys to encrypt the
message and authenticate with each charging pad it encounters.
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EV-Utility Authentication
In order to authenticate with the utility, EV e sends
msg 3 : {Ie, te}e→C (5.4)
to utility C upon entering the charging section. Here Ie is the permanent
ID of EV e, and te is a timestamp generated by EV e.
When receiving msg 3 from EV e, utility C decrypts the message and
verifies the EV’s digital signature. It also verifies that the timestamp te is
within a valid range. C then selects an unassigned pseudonym π ∈ Π at
random and sends
msg 4 : {Ie, te, tC , π,KEf(pi),KAf(pi)}C→e (5.5)
back to EV e, where KEf(pi) and K
A
f(pi) are the encryption and authentication
keys with index f(π), te is the timestamp received in msg 3, and tC is the
utility’s current time. Note that only EV e can decrypt msg 4 since it is
encrypted using e’s public key. The message is also signed by utility C to
ensure its authenticity.
EV-Pad Authentication
Once on the charging section, in order to authenticate with a charging pad
within range, EV e periodically broadcasts the beacon
msg 5 : beacon = (π,EtM
KA
f(pi)
KE
f(pi)
(C, π, te, lˆe(te), req)), (5.6)
where C is the utility that assigned the pseudonym π and the session keys
KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi) to EV e, te is the current timestamp generated by the EV, and
lˆe(te) is the estimated location of EV e at time te. The req field contains
charging parameters needed by the charging pad, such as the EV’s battery
and coil type and the desired charging rate. The broadcast frequency is
determined by the EV based on its speed. As an example, if pads are
λ = 0.4 m long and are spaced δ = 0.4 m, an EV moving at 108km/h may
broadcast the beacon every 15 ms.
The pseudonym π in plaintext is used by the pad to locate the corre-
sponding session keys. When pad p receives the beacon, it uses the mapping
f shared with utility C to compute f(π). It then verifies the MAC on the
ciphertext using key KAf(pi). If the MAC verification succeeds, the ciphertext
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is not tampered. Pad p then decrypts the ciphertext using key KEf(pi), and
verifies that: (i) the plaintext and the encrypted pseudonyms match; (ii) te
is valid, by checking |te − tp| < ǫt, where ǫt is the accepted time mismatch;
and (iii) lˆe(te) is valid, by checking ‖lˆe(te)− lp‖ < ǫl, where ǫl is the accepted
location mismatch. We discuss how to determine the values of ǫl and ǫt in
Section 5.2.3 and 5.3, respectively.
If all verifications succeed then pad p will switch on and charge the EV. At
the same time it removes the corresponding keys KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi) from its local
storage, and thus ignores any further messages using the same pseudonym
π.
If verifications (i) and (ii) succeed (i.e., whether or not the EV’s estimated
location lˆe(te) is accurate enough), pad p sends
msg 6 : EtM
KA
f(pi)
KE
f(pi)
(π, te, tp, lp, ack) (5.7)
to EV e, where te is the timestamp received in EV e’s beacon, tp is the
timestamp generated by pad p, and lp is the pad’s known location. The ack
field contains semantic information for the EV, such as whether the EV is
properly aligned with the charging pad, or whether the EV should adjust
its speed.
If the location estimate lˆe(te) is inaccurate (and thus verification (iii) fails)
then the pad will not switch on, but it will still send msg 6 to the EV. In
this case the lp field in msg 6 helps EV e to improve its location estimate.
Note that even if msg 6 is lost, the charging pad would still charge the EV
if it has received an authentic msg 5 from the EV.
5.2.3 Estimating the EV’s location
Recall that in order for a pad to switch on, Portunes requires that EV e’s lo-
cation estimate lˆe(t) be within ǫl of its actual location. The simplest solution
for an EV to estimate its location would be to use its on-board GPS, but
this solution has several drawbacks. First, the horizontal accuracy of GPS is
up to 2.2 meters with 95% probability [47], thus the range may include the
locations of multiple charging pads. Second, GPS signals may be unavail-
able, e.g., in tunnels. Third, a failure of the GPS receiver would prevent an
EV from using dynamic charging, hence from reaching its destination. We
argue that such a dependency on a built in system would be undesirable.
It is for these reasons that Portunes assists the EV’s location estimation
through including lp in msg 6. Note that if EV e is able to receive msg 6 at
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time t from pad p, then the horizontal distance ‖lp − le(t)‖ between pad p
and EV e at time t satisfies
‖lp − le(t)‖ <
√
r2 − h2 + v¯ · τ, (5.8)
where
√
r2 − h2 is the maximum horizontal distance between the wireless
device at the bottom of the EV and the charging pad in its communication
range r, τ is the transmission delay of msg 6, and v¯ is the EV’s average
speed during time τ .
In Portunes if EV e receives msg 6 from pad p then it updates its estimated
location lˆe(t) to pad p’s location lp, as this provides very good accuracy. As
an example, if r = 0.5 m, h = 0.3 m, v¯ = 108 km/h, and τ = 1 ms, the
location estimation error is ‖lˆe(t)− le(t)‖ = ‖lp − le(t)‖ < 0.45 m, which is
significantly less than GPS’s horizontal accuracy of 2.2 m at 95% confidence.
Upon sending the next beacon at time t′, the EV can estimate its location
lˆe(t
′) = lˆe(t) + ~ve(t) · (t′ − t) (5.9)
where t is the last time that EV e receives msg 6 from some pad p, ~ve(t) is
the EV’s velocity at time t, and lˆe(t) is the EV’s location estimation at time
t when it receives msg 6 from pad p, i.e., lˆe(t) = lp. If an EV broadcasts a
beacon every few milliseconds, t′ − t is small, and the EV’s velocity change
during (t, t′) can be neglected.2
In order for pad p to receive a beacon from EV e, their horizontal distance
must be less than
√
r2 − h2. Therefore, the allowed location error ǫl must
satisfy ǫl >
√
r2 − h2+‖lˆe(t)− le(t)‖. In our example where ‖lˆe(t)− le(t)‖ <
0.45m and
√
r2 − h2 = 0.4m, a reasonable choice could be ǫl = 1m.
5.2.4 Implicit Authentication
We say an EV is explicitly authenticated by a charging pad if the charging
pad successfully receives and verifies the EV’s beacon as described in sec-
tion 5.2. Due to the unreliable nature of the wireless channel, the EV may
still fail to explicitly authenticate with the charging pad , as we will see in
Section 5.4. In order to increase the probability of overall successful authen-
tication, in this section we propose an implicit authentication protocol.
2Federal standards (e-CFR 393.82) in the US allow a maximum speedometer error of
8 km/h at speed 80 km/h. If the EV broadcasts the beacon every 15 ms, i.e., t′ − t = 15
ms, the location error introduced by speedometer inaccuracy is at most (8 km/h·15 ms
=) 0.03 meter.
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One approach to increase the probability of overall successful authentica-
tion would be to let charging pad p that explicitly authenticates EV π at time
t to send a witness message to the nextm charging pads p+1, p+2, . . . , p+m.
With a properly chosen m, it is safe to assume that between the moment t
when EV π authenticates with pad p and the future moment t′ when EV π
reaches pad p +m, only EV π is moving from pad p to pad p +m. Then,
for each p < q ≤ p+m, charging pad q can implicitly authenticate the first
EV seen after time t as EV π if it receives the witness message from p, with-
out directly verifying the EV’s beacon. Note that only the charging pads
that explicitly authenticate the EV can generate witness messages, whereas
a charging pad that implicitly authenticates the EV can only forward a
previous witness message. This guarantees that the EV must explicitly au-
thenticate with at least one of every m+ 1 charging pads.
Whenever a charging pad p explicitly authenticates an EV as described in
Section 5.2, it forwards a witness message (p, π, v, t) to the next m charging
pads p+1, . . . , p+m, where π is the authenticated EV’s pseudonym, v is the
EV’s speed, and t is the witness time. The witness pad can either learn the
EV’s speed if the EV includes its speed in the beacon, or can measure the
EV’s speed with sensors. When pad q receives the witness message (p, π, v, t)
from pad p, it computes the estimated time-of-arrival eta = t + d(q−p)v ,
where d = λ+ δ is the distance between the wireless devices of two neighbor
charging pads. If pad q receives two messages (p, π, v1, t1) and (p
′, π, v2, t2)
about the same EV π where p′ < p < q, it uses the message (p, π, v1, t1) from
pad p to compute eta, and discards the message from pad p′. If at time t′
where t′ < eta, pad q learns that some EV is above it (even if pad q fails
to receive the EV’s beacon, it can still learn its presence through pressure
sensors), pad q implicitly authenticates the EV as π and starts charging its
battery.
5.3 Security and Privacy Analysis
If the attacker compromises the utility or the PO, he is able to disrupt
dynamic charging of an EV or on a charging section, respectively. If the
attacker compromises charging pads he may obtain the entire key set, but
compromising the PO or charging pads does not threaten the EV’s location
privacy due to using pseudonyms. Portunes assumes that the infrastructure,
such as the utility, the PO, and the charging pads, are trusted, and the above
attacks are out of the scope of this chapter.
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An attacker driving an EV may capture the beacon (msg 5) sent by EV
e to pad p by either following the victim EV e or with the help of receivers
previously deployed by the attacker along the charging section. Once the
attacker captures the beacon, he could replay the beacon to a pad p′ and
impersonate EV e. For a pad p′ to validate the beacon, the attacker has to
replay the beacon to a nearby pad p′ with |lp′ − lˆe| < ǫl (and thus |lp′ − lp| <
2ǫl) and within 2ǫt time. Furthermore, for pad p
′ to switch on, either (i)
the beacon of EV e was not received by pad p′ due to noise or jamming (the
attacker follows EV e), or (ii) EV e has not yet reached pad p′ (the attacker
is in front of EV e).
In case (i) the attacker has to wait for EV e to leave pad p′ and should
drive above pad p′ itself in order to receive free charging. Assuming that
EV e is 5 meters long and denoting the speed of EV e (and of the attacker)
by ve, the attacker has to be within veǫt − 5 + 2ǫl distance of EV e. At a
speed of v = 108km/h and ǫt = 200ms this corresponds to about 6m, which
is infeasible. In case (ii) the attacker has to be in front of EV e, but within
2ǫl − 5 distance, which again is infeasible. Recall that if |lp′ − lˆe| > ǫl then
pad p′ does not activate, but sends msg 6 in response, which the attacker
cannot decrypt without the key Kf(pi).
Although not able to charge its EV, an attacker may replay a captured
beacon immediately to a nearby pad p′. This would cause pad p′ to switch
on before EV e arrives to it, after which p′ would not validate the beacon
of EV e. This attack is, however, rather costly as in order for the attacker
to perform this attack to the entire charging section, the attacker must be
able to capture a new beacon every 2ǫt time.
An attacker could attempt to (i) link the pseudonyms used by the same EV
at different charging sections, and infer the victim EV’s route; or (ii) infer
that the same victim EV has visited a charging section repeatedly. Portunes
defends against these attacks by assigning pseudonyms randomly to EVs.
The only thing an attacker can infer is that an EV with pseudonym π is
moving across a charging section, since within a charging section the EV uses
the same pseudonym to communicate with all charging pads. Nevertheless,
this information would be of little value to the attacker, as a charging section
is typically only a few kilometers long.
In Portunes, the utility is able to learn the mapping between the EV’s true
identity and its pseudonym because in the EV-utility authentication step,
the EV authenticates itself using PKI with long-term public key in order to
obtain the pseudonym from the utility. To enhance the location privacy of
EVs, anonymous credentials can be used to replace PKI authentication so
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that the utility does not learn the mapping between the EV’s pseudonym
and its true identity. In particular, the utility would issue a number of
single-use anonymous credentials to the EV at the beginning of the billing
cycle. During the EV-Utility authentication step in Portunes (i.e., msg 3
in Section 5.2.2), instead of using PKI-based authentication, the EV would
simply spend an unused anonymous credential to prove to the utility that
it is a legitimate EV, e.g., the utility could send a random challenge to the
EV and the EV would reveal an unused anonymous credential and bind
the double-spending equation to the random challenge similar to the price
validation part of Janus described in Section 6.4.2.
5.4 Evaluation
In this section we present evaluation result on the performance, overhead,
and reliability of Portunes.
5.4.1 Authentication Speed
We implemented Portunes on Raspberry Pi 2 Model B [48] using Crypto++
5.6.2. The RaspberryPi features a 900 MHz Quad-core CPU and 1 GB RAM,
and costs $35 (USD) at the time of writing. For comparison we also imple-
mented Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [43], which is
recommended by the current IEEE 802.11p standard for authenticating ve-
hicular communication, on the same platform. In Figure 5.2 we compare the
generation and verification time of the beacon (msg 5) using Portunes and
using ECDSA. We use AES with CFB mode and a 128-bit key for symmet-
ric encryption in Portunes, and use ECDSA on P-224 curve, which results
in a 448-bit signature. Both Portunes and ECDSA provide 112-bit security
strength in this setup. We assume the EV’s true identity and pseudonym
are both 64-bit.
Portunes takes 0.07 ms to generate a 100 byte beacon, and 0.02 ms to
verify the beacon. The generation and verification times increase to 0.15 ms
and 0.11 ms, respectively, as the beacon size increases to 900 bytes. In
practice the beacon size would depend on the semantic parameters contained
in the req field. In comparison, for all beacon sizes, ECDSA takes over 9 ms
to generate a signature, and over 14 ms to verify a signature, i.e., almost
two orders of magnitude more.
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Figure 5.2: Generation and verification time of beacon (msg 5) using
Portunes and ECDSA vs. message size. Error bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals.
5.4.2 Reliability
Since an EV must authenticate with the charging pad before it can be
charged, it is important to ensure a high authentication success probabil-
ity for the range of EV speeds of interest through choosing an appropriate
beacon broadcast frequency. In the following we derive a model to support
choosing a good beacon broadcast frequency.
For simplicity we consider an EV e that moves at constant speed v over
the charging section. Varying speed can be included in the model at the
expense of increased complexity. We denote by f the frequency at which
the EV broadcasts its beacon, and by xi the location of the EV upon the
ith broadcast, thus, xi = x1 + (i − 1) vf . We denote by xp the location
of charging pad p, and without loss of generality we let x1 = 0 (i.e., all
locations are relative to that of the first charging pad). We define the first
broadcast (i = 1) to be the first broadcast within range of charging pad
p = 1. Note that if the EV starts to send beacons without knowledge of
the pads’ locations then the location x1 of the first broadcast is uniformly
distributed on (−√r2 − h2,√r2 − h2). Finally, we denote by dip the distance
between the communication device of the EV and that of charging pad p
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upon the ith broadcast,
dip(x
1) =
√
h2 + (xp − x1 + (i− 1)v
f
)2. (5.10)
Let us denote by Pt the transmit power used by the EV to transmit the
beacons, and by PL(d) the air path loss as a function of the distance d,
which is assumed to be quadratic. For given receiver bandwidth B, noise
power N and target bit rate fb we can compute the per bit energy to noise
ratio as
Eb
N0
= Pt − PL(d)−N − fb
B
in dB, (5.11)
and assuming that the radio channel is subject to additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) we can compute the bit error rate β(d) as a function of the
distance d between the EV and the charging pad as
β(d) =
1
2
erfc(
√
Eb
N0
) (5.12)
.
In order to combat bit errors we assume that broadcasts are protected
by a channel code with rate n−cn , where n is the total number of bits in a
beacon, and c is the number of redundant bits. Assuming a binary erasure
channel, such a code is sufficient for correcting up to c bit errors among n
bits. Since the horizontal displacement of the EV between transmitting two
consecutive bits is very small, we can consider that all bits of a broadcast
are transmitted at the same distance from the receiving pad. Assuming an
i.i.d. loss process, we can thus compute the probability γ(d) that a broadcast
from the EV is received successfully over a distance d as
γ(d) =
c∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
β(d)j(1− β(d))n−j (5.13)
In order to obtain a lower bound on the authentication probability, we
make the assumption that the success probability γ(d) is negligible when
d >
√
r2 − h2, and we denote by pi the charging pad closest to the location
of the EV upon broadcasting beacon i. Let A denote the event that the EV
successfully authenticates with the charging pad. Using the above we can
now express the cumulative probability of successful authentication condi-
tional on the relative location x of the EV and on the location of the first
48
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8C
um
ul
at
ive
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 o
f a
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 s
uc
ce
ss
Distance traveled [m]
freq=70, v=15 m/s
freq=70, v=30 m/s
freq=40, v=15 m/s
freq=40, v=30 m/s
freq=10, v=15 m/s
freq=10, v=30 m/s
Figure 5.3: Cumulative probability that the EV has made at least one
successful authentication as a function of the distance traveled.
beacon broadcast as
P (A|x, x1) =
⌊(x−x1)/(v/f)⌋∑
i=1
γ(dipi(x
1))
i−1∏
j=1
(1− γ(djpj (x1))), (5.14)
and can use the law of total probability to compute P (A|x) using the dis-
tribution of x1.
In the following we show results for r = 0.5 m, h = 0.3 m, cn = 1/8, and
n−c = 512 bits. In Figure 5.3 we plot the cumulative probability that the EV
has made at least one successful authentication as a function of the distance
traveled. The figure shows that a broadcast frequency of 10 is insufficient to
achieve a good authentication probability; a medium broadcast frequency
of 40 is sufficient when the EV is moving at a low speed of 15 m/s; but a
broadcast frequency of 70 guarantees high authentication success probability
even at high speeds. The almost step-wise increase of the curves is due to
the regular placement of the charging pads.
In Figure 5.4 we plot the probability of at least one successful authentica-
tion as a function of the inter-beacon distance, i.e, vf , for various values of
the distance traveled. We observe that the curves corresponding to a larger
total travel distance are above the lines that correspond to a smaller total
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Figure 5.4: Probability of at least one successful authentication vs.
inter-beacon distance vf .
travel distance, which is consistent with the intuition that the success proba-
bility increases with the distance traveled: as the distance increases, the EV
has more opportunities to broadcast at a position with a good packet suc-
cess probability (e.g., right above the wireless device of the charging pad),
and as a result the lines with larger total travel distance have more peaks
(c.f. the concavity of the curves in Figure 5.3). Note that the peaks are 0.8
meters away from each other, which is due to that the charging pads are
0.4 meters long and are placed 0.4 meters away from each other. If the EV
broadcasts every 0.8 meters, its relative position to its current charging pad
will always be the same, and if the EV’s first broadcast happens at a posi-
tion with poor packet delivery ratio (e.g., at the edge of its current charging
pad’s communication range), its next broadcast will suffer from the same
poor packet delivery ratio. Similarly, the first peak occurs at vf = 1.2 meters
because even if the EV’s first broadcast is at the edge of the charging pad’s
range, its next broadcast 1.2 meters away will be right above the wireless
device of the next charging pad.
We now compare the above model with the location-independent (LI)
model proposed in [49], which assumes a location-independent packet success
probability, and is an approximation to the above model. The LI model
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of our model with the approximate model in [49]
for a total travel distance of 0.8 m and packet drop ratios
s = 0.05, 0.5, 0.95.
considers that while traveling a distance of D, an EV will make a total of
D · fv broadcasts. Assuming that each beacon is dropped with probability
s, the probability of at least one successful authentication is 1− sD· fv .
In Figure 5.5 we compare the LI model from [49] with our model using a
travel distance of D = 0.8 m (i.e., a single pad) for three values of the packet
drop ratio (s = 0.05, 0.5, 0.95) The simple model with s = 0.5 approximates
our model for larger values of vf , but underestimates the success probability
for lower values of vf . This is because with lower values of
v
f , the EV makes
multiple broadcasts within the communication range of the charging pad,
and our model considers the different success probabilities at the different
broadcast positions.
5.4.3 Storage and Communication Overhead
To complete the assessment of the feasibility of Portunes, we quantify the
approximate storage and communication requirements of the utility. We as-
sume that the utility will store the EV’s true identity, its assigned pseudonym
and session key for each charging session, until the end of the current
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monthly billing cycle, i.e., for up to 30 days. Assume that the EV’s true
identity e, pseudonym π, and the session keys KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi) are all 128 bits
long each. Then each entry takes (128 ∗ 4 =)512 bits. According to current
statistics there are about 250 million registered vehicles in the US, and as-
suming that all the vehicles are electric vehicles, total storage cost would be
(250 ∗ 106 ∗ 512 ∗ 30 =)480 GB, which is manageable given today’s storage
technology. Note that our calculation is an overestimation since the total
storage cost is likely to be spread across multiple utilities in different areas
of the nation.
Next, we quantify the communication overhead when the utility pre-
distributes key material to the PO. The annual average daily traffic (AADT)
of a highly congested road is generally in the order of hundreds of thousands
of cars. Thus, we consider a congested road section with an AADT of 500,000
EVs. If the indexed key set is generated daily, then the utility needs to send
at least 500,000 index-key tuples (f(π),KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi)) to the PO. Assume
we use SHA-1 as the one-way function f to derive the key index f(π) from
pseudonym π, and assume KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi) are both 128 bits, then each index-
key pair costs 160 + 128 ∗ 2 = 416 bits, and the communication overhead
incurred by daily key pre-distribution is 500, 000 ∗ 416 bits = 26 MB, which
can be easily delivered over a public network (from the utility to the PO).
Furthermore, if the PO communicates with each charging pad using medium
speed powerline communication (with typical data rates up to 576 kbits/s),
the entire key set can be delivered from the PO to a charging pad in about
10 minutes, which shows that the communication requirements of Portunes
can be met with off-the-shelf communication technologies.
5.5 Related Work
Authentication for dynamic charging can be viewed as a special case of
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) authentication, in that the infrastructure in
question is a series of charging pads that (i) have very short range commu-
nication (several meters); and (ii) are placed closely to each other (tens of
centimeters). These features distinguish dynamic charging authentication
from authentication between vehicles and roadside units (RSUs) [25], and
from authentication between EVs and static charging stations [50]. To the
best of our knowledge, Portunes is the first work that focus on authentication
in the dynamic charging scenario. Key pre-distribution based authentica-
tion was primarily used in wireless sensor networks [51], and has also been
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adapted to vehicular network [52]. Our work differs in that EV e is authen-
ticated using two keys KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi) instead of a large subset of keys, and
incurs less overhead during key transmission. One-time signatures [13, 14]
only allow the EV to sign one or several messages using the same key. In
our scenario this would imply that a single EV needs thousands of keys in
order to authenticate with each charging pad in the charging section, which
incurs considerable key generation and distribution cost and is impractical.
FastAuth [12] limits the message content to vehicle’s location and speed,
whereas Portunes allows the EV to include arbitrary information, such as
battery type and desired charging rate, in the beacon (msg 5). HIP-based
solutions [30, 53] for micro-mobility would incur non-trivial overhead dur-
ing authentication handover between charging pads, and are infeasible in
our scenario where an EV encounters a new pad every tens of milliseconds.
RSU-based privacy-preserving authentication [25, 54] for VANET generally
requires the vehicle to negotiate with an RSU to obtain a temporary session
key. This is similar to our case where the utility allocates pseudonym π and
keys KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi) to an EV before it enters a charging section. Portunes dif-
fers from existing works in that the keys KEf(pi),K
A
f(pi) are pre-distributed to
all the charging pads before it is assigned to an EV. This provides seamless
authentication handover, which is crucial in dynamic charging where an EV
must authenticate with a new charging pad every tens of milliseconds.
One popular option for privacy-preserving option is pseudonym-based
schemes [55, 56, 57, 50, 58, 59], which allow the EV to authenticate with
other entities using pseudonyms. Yang et al. [60] described a privacy-
preserving protocol called P 2, where each EV uses a permit to authenticate
itself with the connected power grid. The permit was generated by a trusted
third party using partially blind signature and cannot be linked to the EV’s
real identity. Li et al. [55] proposed to use self-generated pseudonyms and
identity-based signatures (IBS) to achieve privacy-preserving authentica-
tion. RAISE [56] is an RSU-based authentication mechanism that achieves
k-anonymity. Nicanfar et al. [50, 58] considered the location privacy problem
when the EV charges its battery at multiple charging stations, and suggested
the use of different pseudonym at different charging stations. Mustafa et
al. [61] considered a similar problem where the EV roams to another loca-
tion and receives charging service from a different utility, where pseudonym
is used to protect the EV’s identity from the host utility.
Group signature [62] is another popular option for privacy-preserving au-
thentication, and has been adopted in vehicular network [54, 63, 64, 65, 66].
In group signatures, a group leader generates keys for each member to sign
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their messages. A verifier outside the group cannot infer the signer’s identity
from the signature, and only knows that the signer belongs to the group. In
the vehicular network settings, one common approach is to use the RSU as
group leader and treat all EVs within the RSU’s communication range as
its group members.
Researchers have also considered cooperative authentication [12, 67, 68,
69, 70, 71] for vehicular network. In cooperative authentication, each vehicle
probabilistically verifies only a percentage of the messages, and cooperatively
shares its verification result with other vehicles. In this way, cooperative
authentication reduces the redundant verification of the same signature by
different vehicles. The implicit authentication described in Section 5.2.4
follows the same intuition as cooperative authentication. The difference is
that in our case, it is the charging pads that are cooperating with each other
by sharing the location information of successfully authenticated EVs.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented Portunes, a privacy-preserving authentication
protocol for EV to authenticate with wireless charging pads during dynamic
charging. Portunes adopts a key-predistribution approach where the session
keys are pre-distributed to the charging pads during idle period when there
are less traffic on the road. This allows the protocol to bypass the key dis-
semination to charging pads in real time, and allows the EVs to perform
lightweight authentication with the charging pads. By assigning unlinkable
pseudonyms to the EV in different charging sections, Portunes also preserves
the EV’s location privacy. The implementation on Raspberry Pi indicates
that message generation and verification using Portunes are both signifi-
cantly faster than using ECDSA. Our security analysis shows that Portunes
effectively mitigates outside attacks, and numerical results show that Por-
tunes is both computationally efficient and can enable reliable charging.
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CHAPTER 6
JANUS
In this chapter, we describe Janus, a privacy-preserving billing protocol
for dynamic charging for the subscription-based billing model described in
Section 2.4. In particular, in the bill calculation process, the utility is not
able to learn when and where the EV has used dynamic charging. Our main
idea is to embed homomorphic commitment of the price for each charging
session as attributes in blind signatures signed by the utility. The EV and
the PO compute their respective total fees locally and submit the values to
the utility. The utility verifies that the total price is consistent with the
combined homomorphic commitments. We implemented Janus in Python
based on petlib [72] and evaluated the execution time on the Raspberry Pi
platform. Our results show that all computations can be done within 0.6
seconds, which is well within the delay constraint for the subscription-based
billing model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 6.1, we intro-
duce our models and key assumptions; in Section 6.2, we briefly describe
security building blocks; in Section 6.3, we summarize key notations; in
Section 6.4, we present the Janus protocol; in Section 6.5, we analyze secu-
rity and privacy properties of Janus; in Section 6.6, we present performance
evaluation results; in Section 6.7, we discuss several related issues; in Sec-
tion 6.8, we review important related works; and we conclude this chapter
in Section 6.9.
6.1 Model and Assumption
In this section we describe the models and assumptions.
6.1.1 Billing Model
Janus is designed for the subscription-based billing model introduced in
Section 2.4. Recall that the billing model consists of two operations: fee
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negotiation and fee aggregation.
• Fee negotiation happens prior to each dynamic charging session, where
the EV and the PO negotiate and agree on the charging fee that the
EV should pay for the coming dynamic charging session.
• Fee aggregation happens only once at the end of each billing cycle,
where the EV calculates and submits to the utility its total fee that
it should pay to the utility, and the PO calculates and submits to the
utility the total fee that it should receive from the utility.
We refer the reader to Section 2.4 for a more detailed description of the
billing model.
6.1.2 Communication Model
We assume the EV can communicate wirelessly with the utility and each PO
through WiFi, DSRC, or cellular network. The particular communication
technology is not of interest in this chapter. We also assume a fast reliable
connection (e.g., Ethernet) between the utility and each PO.
6.1.3 Security Model
We assume that the utility is honest but curious, in that it faithfully follows
the protocol but is interested to infer location information of individual EVs.
We assume that in the fee negotiation phase of the subscription-based billing
model, the EV and the PO are able to agree on the fee for each individual
charging session. However, in the fee aggregation phase at the end of each
billing cycle, we assume that the EV may attempt to underclaim its total
fee that should be paid to the utility, and the PO may attempt to overclaim
the total fee that it should receive from the utility.
6.1.4 Design Goals
Janus has two major design goals: correctness and privacy-preservation.
• Correctness: the correctness goal states that the total fees submitted
by the EV and the PO to the utility in the fee aggregation phase of
the billing model must be consistent with the charging fees of each
individual charging session. In particular, the EV should be able to
prove to the utility that it does not underclaim the total fee, and the
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PO should be able to prove to the utility that it does not overclaim
the total fee.
• Privacy-preservation: the privacy-preservation goal states that the
protocol should minimize information available to the utility that can
be used to infer location information of individual EVs. In particu-
lar, for each individual charging session, the time of the charging, the
identity of the PO, and the charging fee for this individual charging
session should all be hidden from the utility.
6.2 Security Building Blocks
In this section we describe the security building blocks used in the construc-
tion of Janus.
6.2.1 Homomorphic Commitment
A commitment scheme allows a user to bind a secret value x to a commit-
ment C. The commitment C itself is information-hiding in that C does not
reveal any information about x. Later the user can reveal the secret value
x and prove that C is indeed a commitment of x. One example of perfect
information-hiding commitment is the Pederson commitment scheme [73]: to
commit a value x, the user chooses a random secret r and compute C = gxhr,
where g and h are public. In order to prove that x is indeed committed in
C, the user reveals x and r, and the verifier computes C ′ = gxhr and checks
that C = C ′.
A homomorphic commitment scheme additionally allows one to obtain
useful information by operating directly on commitments, without knowing
the secret values in the commitments. A Pederson commitment can be
extended to a homomorphic commitment as follows: given C1 = g
x1hr1 and
C2 = g
x2hr2 , we define
C1 ⊞ C2 = C1C2 = g
x1+x2hr1+r2 (6.1)
Note that anyone can compute C1⊞C2, given only C1 and C2. Later the user
can prove that x1+x2 equals to the claimed value, without revealing x1 and
x2 themselves, by revealing r1+r2. In this chapter we use Cmt(x1, . . . , xn; r)
to denote a Pedersen commitment with secret values x1, . . . , xn and com-
mitment opener r.
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6.2.2 Zero-Knowledge Proof
In Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP), the prover proves to the verifier possession
of certain secret values that satisfy certain relations. The proof is zero-
knowledge in the sense that the proof itself does not reveal any additional
information about the secret values. We use notation ZK{x : P (x)} to
denote a zero-knowledge proof of secret value x such that x satisfies the
relation P (x). Every variable that appears to the left of the colon is a
secret value only known to the prover, and every variable that only appears
to the right of the colon is public. For example, the following notation
ZK{x, r : gxhr = C} represents a zero-knowledge proof that the prover
knows the secret value x and the commitment opener r that is used to form
the Pedersen commitment C.
A zero-knowledge proof is interactive if it involves real-time interaction
(e.g., message exchanges) between the prover and the verifier. One example
is the Schnorr Identification scheme [27], which, given public values g and
h, allows the prover to prove knowledge of value x such that gx = h without
revealing x. In Figure 6.1 we illustrate the Schnorr Identification scheme.
Prover (input=x, g, h = gx) Verifier (input=g, h)
y ← random secret
a← gy
a
c← random secret
c
r ← y + cx
r
verify that gr = ahc
Figure 6.1: Schnorr Identification Scheme.
One can transform an interactive zero-knowledge proof into a non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof (NIZKP) using the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic [74].
6.2.3 Blind Signature with Attributes
A blind signature scheme allows the user to obtain a signature from the
signer while the signer does not learn the content of the message to be signed.
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Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya extended the definition of blind signature and
introduced the concept of blind signature with attributes [27]. In addition
to the message m, the user possesses certain secret attributes L1, . . . , Ln
and commits the attributes in a commitment C = Cmt(L1, . . . , Ln;R) with
commitment opener R. The commitment C is public while the message m
and the attributes L1, . . . , Ln are only known to the user. A blind signature
with attribute would allow the user to obtain a signature σ on (m, C˜), where
C˜ is a new commitment to the same attributes L1, . . . , Ln but with a different
opening secret R˜, i.e., C˜ = Cmt(L1, . . . , Ln; R˜). The commitment opener R˜
of the new commitment C˜ is only known to the user. In this chapter we use
the Anonymous Credential Light (ACL) [27] as the implementation of the
blind signature with attributes scheme.
6.2.4 Single-Use Anonymous Credentials
An anonymous credential allows the user to prove possession of the cre-
dential without revealing the user’s true identity. A single-use anonymous
credential further guarantees that the credential can be used at most once. If
the user attempts to spend a single-use credential more than once, the user’s
true identity can be revealed. In [27] the authors described a construction
of single-use anonymous credentials using blind signatures with attributes.
Let L1 denote the user’s true identity. To obtain a single-use anonymous
credential, the user first generates a random secret L0, and constructs a com-
mitment C = Cmt(L0, L1;R). The user then proves to the signer knowledge
of L0, L1, R with respect to C and obtains a blind signature σ on (m, C˜),
where m is a random message and C˜ = Cmt(L0, L1; R˜). To spend the cre-
dential, the user reveals m, C˜, σ, receives a challenge c from the verifier, and
then reveals the double-spending factor d = cL1 + L0. The verifier veri-
fies that σ is a valid signature on (m, C˜). Note that if the user attempts
to spend the same credential twice, the verifier would know d = cL1 + L0
and d′ = c′L1 + L0, from which the user’s true identity can be inferred as
L1 =
d−d′
c−c′ .
6.3 Notation
In this section, we summarize key notations used in the protocol. This sec-
tion is meant for quick reference, and the reader should refer to Section 6.4
for detailed explanation of constructions such as the EV’s anonymous cre-
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dential and the receipts.
• H: one-way hash function.
• e: EV’s true identity.
• p: PO’s true identity.
• u: Utility’s true identity.
• (e, p, u, i, j): index of the charging session in question, which is the
i-th charging session of EV e, and the j-th charging session of PO p
with any EV subscribed to utility u.
• P = P ei = P p,uj : the three variables all denote the same charging fee
for a particular charging session agreed by EV e and PO p.
• Cmt(L0, L1, . . . , Ln;R): Pederson commitment of (L0, L1, . . . , Ln) with
commitment opener R.
• NIZK{(x1, . . . , xn) : P (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)}: Non-Interactive Zero-
Knowledge proof of knowledge. The prover proves knowledge of secret
values x1, . . . , xn which satisfy the relation P (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym),
where y1, . . . , ym are public values.
• τ ei = (snei , Cˆei , σˆei ): single-use anonymous credential issued by the util-
ity to EV e during the registration phase.
• snei : a random secret generated by EV e.
• Cˆei : Cˆei = Cmt(Lei , e; Rˆei ) is a Pedersen commitment with random
secret Lei and EV’s identity e as committed values.
• Lei : random secret generated by EV e.
• c: challenge used in the double-spending equation de,p,ui,j .
• de,p,ui,j : de,p,ui,j = c · e + Lei is the double-spending equation that allows
identification of the EV’s identity e if the same single-use credential
τ ei is spent twice.
• σˆei : utility’s ACL signature on (snei , Cˆei ).
• (mei , C˜ei , σei ): the receipt of EV e.
• σei : utility’s ACL signature on (mei , C˜ei ).
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• mei : mei = Cmt(e; zei ) is a Pedersen commitment with the EV’s identity
e as the committed value, and commitment opener zei that is only
known to EV e.
• C˜ei : C˜ei = Cmt(P ei ; R˜ei ) is a Pedersen commitment with the charging
fee P ei as the committed value, and commitment opener R˜
e
i known to
both PO p and EV e.
• (mp,uj , C˜p,uj , σp,uj ): the receipt of PO p.
• σp,uj : utility’s ACL signature on (mp,uj , C˜p,uj )
• mp,uj : mp,uj = Cmt(p; zp,uj ) is a Pedersen commitment with the PO’s
identity p as the committed value, and commitment opener zp,uj that
is only known to PO p.
• C˜p,uj : C˜p,uj = Cmt(P p,uj ; R˜p,uj ) is a Pedersen commitment with the
charging fee P p,uj as the committed value, and commitment opener
R˜p,uj only known to PO p.
6.4 Janus Protocol
In this section, we describe the Janus protocol in detail. Janus consists of
three phases: registration, price validation, and reconciliation. In Figure 6.2,
we illustrate when each phase is executed during the billing cycle.
Figure 6.2: Illustration of Janus phases during the billing cycle.
• The registration phase happens once at the beginning of each billing
cycle between each EV e and the utility, where the utility issues N
single-use credentials τ e1 , . . . , τ
e
N to EV e. For each dynamic charging
session the EV must spend one unused credential.
• The price validation phase happens at the beginning of each dynamic
charging session (after the EV and the PO have agreed on the charging
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fee for the incoming charging session, and before the actual charging
happens), where EV e, PO p and utility u run the price validation
protocol described in Section 6.4.2. As a result, EV e obtains receipt
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) and PO p obtains receipt (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) on the price
P ei = P
p,u
j = P from the utility u, where σ
e
i is the utility’s signature
on the pair (mei , C˜
e
i ), and σ
p,u
j is the utility’s signature on the pair
(mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j ). The price validation protocol uses blind signature so
that the utility does not learn either mp,uj nor C˜
p,u
j during the signing
process. The receipt proves that both the EV and the PO agreed on
the price P , and the utility’s signature prevents the EV or the PO
from modifying the receipt.
• The reconciliation phase happens once at the end of the billing cycle,
where EV e submits the total price P e =
∑Me
i=1 P
e
i and all the receipts
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) to the utility. PO p also submits the total price P
p,u =∑Mp
i=1 P
p,u
j and the validation tokens (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ). In addition
each EV e also needs to reveal any unused credentials τ eMe+1, . . . , τ
e
N
to the utility.
We describe each phase in detail below.
6.4.1 Registration
The registration phase happens once at the beginning of each billing cycle.
The main purpose of this phase is for the utility to issue anonymous creden-
tials to the EV that will be used in the price validation phase. We assume
that the EV authenticates with the utility using its true identity (e.g., its
long-term public key) at the beginning of the registration phase, and the
utility knows the EV’s identity during the communication of the registra-
tion phase (but the utility does not learn the anonymous credentials issued
to the EV until the EV spends it). We assume each EV is issued N creden-
tials for each billing cycle. In Figure 6.3 we illustrate how EV e obtains a
single-use credential τ ei = (sn
e
i , Cˆ
e
i , σˆ
e
i ) from the utility as described in [27].
EV e obtains N credentials by repeating the protocol for N times. Below
we describe the registration protocol:
• Step 1: to obtain the i-th credential, the EV first generates random
secrets snei , L
e
i , and R. sn
e
i is a serial number that serves as the
message to be signed, and Lei together with EV’s true identity e serve
as the attribute, as described in Section 6.2.3.
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Figure 6.3: Overview of Registration phase of Janus. The above protocol
shows how EV e obtains one single-use anonymous credential
τ ei = (sn
e
i , Cˆ
e
i , σˆ
e
i ) from the utility. To obtain a total of N credentials, the
EV repeats the above protocol N times at the beginning of the billing
cycle.
• Step 2: the EV commits Lei and its identity e in the commitment
C = Cmt(Lei , e;R) using secret R.
• Step 3: the EV runs the ACL signing protocol with the utility as
the signer on the message snei and attribute commitment C. As a
result, EV e obtains Cˆei , Rˆ
e
i , σˆ
e
i , where Cˆ
e
i is a commitment to the
same attributes (Lei , e) but with a different secret Rˆ
e
i , i.e., Cˆ
e
i =
Cmt(Lei , e; Rˆ
e
i ), and σˆ
e
i is the utility’s signature on the pair (sn
e
i , Cˆ
e
i ).
Note that during the signing process, the utility never learns the value of
Lei , e or the new commitment Cˆ
e
i , and the output signature σˆ
e
i cannot be
linked to this signing session.
6.4.2 Price Validation
We observe that, when the EV uses dynamic charging service provided by
some PO, the PO can physically observe the EV at its charging section, and
thus there is no point hiding the EV’s location information from the PO.
A malicious PO can indeed disclose the identity of the observed EV to the
utility or other entities. Such malicious PO behavior is out of our scope,
and in this chapter we assume that the EV fully trusts the PO and the PO
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does not disclose the EV’s identity and location to any third party. Given
this trust relationship between EV and PO, the PO can act as proxy and
relay messages between the EV and the utility. In particular, the EV never
communicates directly with the utility during the price validation phase.
In Figure 6.4 we illustrate the price validation protocol. We assume that
this is the i-th charging session of EV e in the current billing cycle, and the
j-th charging session of PO p with any EV subscribed to utility u. We thus
denote this dynamic charging session by (e, p, u, i, j). We assume that EV
e and PO p have agreed on the price P for this charging session. The EV
records the price P ei = P and the PO records the price P
p,u
j = P . The goal
of the price validation phase is to let EV e obtains receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) and
PO p obtains receipt (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) on the price P
e
i = P
p,u
j = P from
the utility u. To preserve the EV’s privacy, we use the ACL blind signature
with attributes [27]. In particular, during the signing process, the utility
does not learn the value of the price P , the EV’s identity e, and cannot
link the produced receipts (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) with the signing
session.
The price validation protocol consists of 4 major steps: PO preparation,
EV preparation, receipt generation, and EV validation. Below we describe
each step in detail:
PO Preparation
• Step 1: PO receives a random nonce n generated by the utility.
• Step 2: PO generates a random secret zp,uj and commits its identity p
in mp,uj = Cmt(p; z
p,u
j ).
• Step 3: PO generates two secrets Rei , Rp,uj and commits the price
P = P ei = P
p,u
j in the commitments C
e
i = Cmt(P
e
i ;R
e
i ) and C
p,u
j =
Cmt(P p,uj ;R
p,u
j ).
• Step 4: PO sends Cei , Rei , Cp,uj , Rp,uj , n to the EV.
EV Preparation
• Step 1: EV verifies that the two commitments Cei , Cp,uj are formed
correctly.
• Step 2: EV binds the nonce n generated by the utility with the two
commitments into c = H(n,Cei , C
p,u
j ) using a one-way function H, and
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Figure 6.4: Overview of the Price Validation phase of Janus. We assume
that this is the i-th time EV e receives dynamic charging service from any
PO, and the j-th time that PO p provides dynamic charging service to any
EV subscribing to utility u. As a result, EV e obtains receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i )
and PO p obtains receipt (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) on the price P
e
i = P
p,u
j = P
from the utility u.
65
constructs the double-spending equation de,p,ui,j = c · e + Lei . The EV
is essentially using c as the challenge to spend its single-use credential
τi = (sn
e
i , Cˆ
e
i , σˆ
e
i ).
• Step 3: EV then generates a random secret zei and commits its identity
e in mei = Cmt(e; z
e
i ).
• Step 4: EV constructs a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that
(i) it knows the openings to Cei and C
p,u
j ; and (ii) d
e,p,u
i,j is correctly
formed; and (iii) the single-use credential τi is correctly spent. The
proof-of-knowledge equation is illustrated in equation 6.2.
πe,p,ui,j = NIZK{(Pe, Pp, Re, Rp, Rˆ, e, L) :
Cei = Cmt(Pe;Re) ∧
Cp,uj = Cmt(Pp;Rp) ∧
Cˆei = Cmt(L, e; Rˆ) ∧
de,p,ui,j = H(n,C
e
i , C
p,u
j ) · e+ L}
(6.2)
• Step 5: EV sends the mei , τ ei , de,p,ui,j , πei to the PO.
Receipt Generation
• Step 1: PO sends to the utility Cei , Cp,uj , τ ei , de,p,ui,j , πe,p,ui,j .
• Step 2: utility verifies that the credential τ ei is valid, and πe,p,ui,j is
correct.
• Step 3: utility runs the ACL signing algorithm as the signer with
the PO on (mei , C
e
i ) and (m
p,u
j , C
p,u
j ) respectively. In the end the PO
obtains receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), R˜
e
i , receipt (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ), and R˜
p,u
j ,
where C˜ei = Cmt(P
e
i ; R˜
e
i ) is a commitment to the same attributes P
e
i as
Cei , but with a different secret R˜
e
i , and σ
e
i is the utility’s ACL signature
on (mei , C˜
e
i ). Similarly, C˜
p,u
j = Cmt(P
p,u
j ; R˜
p,u
j ) is a commitment to
the same attributes as Cp,uj , and σ
p,u
j is the utility’s ACL signature on
(mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j ).
• Step 4: PO verifies that the receipts (mei , C˜ei , σei ), (mp,uj , C˜p,uj , σp,uj ) are
formed correctly, and the commitment openers R˜ei , R˜
p,u
j are valid.
• Step 5: PO stores its own receipt (mp,uj , C˜p,uj , σp,uj ) together with R˜p,uj
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• Step 6: PO sends the other receipt (mei , C˜ei , σei ) and the corresponding
commitment opener R˜ei to the EV.
Note that during the signing process, the utility does not learn the value of
mei , C˜
e
i ,m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j .
EV Validation
In this step, the EV receives (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), R˜
e
i from the PO, and verifies that
σei is indeed the utility’s signature on (m
e
i , C˜
e
i ), and that R˜
e
i opens the com-
mitment C˜ei = Cmt(m
e
i ; R˜
e
i ).
6.4.3 Reconciliation
The reconciliation phase happens at the end of the billing cycle. Each EV e
computes the total sum that it should pay the utility u, and each PO p also
computes the total sum that it should receive from utility u.
Assume that in the current billing cycle EV e has engaged in a total of
M e dynamic charging sessions (with any PO), and records the price P ei , the
price receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), the secret R˜
e
i that opens C˜
e
i , and z
e
i that opens
mei , for all 1 ≤ i ≤M e. The EV constructs the total price
P e =
Me∑
i=1
P ei (6.3)
and the commitment opener for the homomorphic commitment
Re =
Me∑
i=1
R˜ei (6.4)
The EV then sends P e, Re together with the receipts (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) and z
e
i for
all 1 ≤ i ≤M e to utility u. The utility checks that
• Cmt(P e;Re) = ΠMei=1C˜ei
• ∀i,mei = Cmt(e; zei )
• σei is a valid ACL signature on (mei , C˜ei ).
The EV also proves to the utility that it does not omit any payment, by
revealing the rest N−M e unused credentials τ eMe+1, . . . , τ eN . If all the above
verifications succeed, the utility accepts P e as the correct total sum that EV
e owns the utility for the billing cycle.
The reconciliation phase for the PO is almost identical. Assume that
in the current billing cycle PO p has engaged in a total of Mp dynamic
charging sessions with any EV subscribed to utility u. PO p construsts
P p,u =
∑Mp
j=1 P
p,u
j and R
p,u =
∑Mp
j=1 R˜
p,u
j , and sends P
p,u, Rp,u together
with (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ), z
p,u
j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ Mp to the utility. The utility
checks that
• Cmt(P p,u;Rp,u) = ΠMpj=1C˜p,uj
• ∀i,mp,uj = Cmt(p; zp,uj )
• σp,uj is a valid ACL signature on (mp,uj , C˜p,uj ).
If all verifications succeed, the utility accepts the value P p,u as the total sum
it owes PO p. Since in the assumed billing model the utility should pay the
PO, the PO has no economic incentive to omit a price value in computing
the total sum P p,u. Therefore, the protocol does not require the PO to prove
to the utility that no price value pp,uj is omitted.
6.5 Analysis
In this section we prove the correctness of Janus and analyze the location
privacy it provides. Throughout the section we focus on EVs that contracted
a particular utility u, and we denote by E the set of EVs that contracted
the considered utility and by P the set of POs.
6.5.1 Correctness
To prove correctness, we have to show that the utility is able to verify that
for each EV e the total charging fee P e submitted by the EV is indeed the
sum of the charging fees of all charging sessions that EV e participated in,
i.e., P e =
∑Me
i=1 P
e
i . Similarly, we have to show that utility u is able to verify
that the total charging fee P p,u claimed by PO p is not more than the sum
of the charging fees of all charging sessions provided by the PO to EVs with
a contract with u, i.e., P p,u ≤∑Mp,uj=1 P p,uj .
First we show that the EV cannot omit payment.
In Janus, the utility does not compute the total fee owed by the EV, it only
verifies that the total fee is consistent with the receipts, both of which are
submitted by the EV. Naturally a malicious EV may attempt to underclaim
the total fee by intentionally withholding submitting one or multiple receipts
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(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ). Janus mitigates this by requiring each EV to spend all of its
single-use anonymous credentials τ ei . Recall that during the registration
phase which happens once at the beginning of each billing cycle, the utility
issues a total of N single-use credentials τ e1 , . . . , τ
e
N to each EV e. In the
price validation phase, in order to receive a receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), EV e must
spend one of its unused credentials. Therefore, if during the reconciliation
phase the EV submits a total of M receipts (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ M e, the
EV must prove to the utility that it still possesses a total of N −M e unused
credentials. The EV can prove this to the utility by repeating a simple
challenge-response protocol for N −M e times: each time the EV receives
a fresh challenge c from the utility it has to spend an unused credential by
binding the credential to the value of c, in a way similar to how the EV
binds the price commitments Cei and C
p,u
j in the double-spending equation
de,p,ui,j = H(n,C
e
i , C
p,u
j ) · e + L as we described in Section 6.4.2. If the EV
fails to prove possession of N −M e unspent credentials, the utility knows
that the EV is trying to omit payments, and can thus levy a fine on the EV.
How high of a fine the utility levies is outside of the scope of the protocol.
Next we show that the EV and PO can only claim correct totals. Before
we prove correctness of Janus in the sense formulated at the beginning of the
section, we establish an important relationship between receipts obtained by
an EV and a PO upon charging. For convenience, let us define the function
Fee that extracts the charging fee from the commitment in a receipt, i.e.,
Fee((m, C˜, σ)) = P where C˜ = Cmt(P ; R˜). (6.5)
Consider the charging fees P ei committed in C˜
e
i , and the charging fees
P p,uj committed in C˜
p,u
j . There exists a bijective mapping f between the set
{(mei , C˜ei , σei ) : ∀e ∈ E , 1 ≤ i ≤ M e} and the set {(mp,uj , C˜p,uj , σp,uj ) : ∀p ∈
P, 1 ≤ j ≤Mp,u} such that Fee((mei , C˜ei , σei )) = Fee(f((mei , C˜ei , σei ))).
Consider an arbitrary receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) of an arbitrary EV e. Without
loss of generality, assume EV e obtained this receipt in session (e, p, u, i, j).
Observe that the price validation phase for charging session (e, p, u, i, j)
starts with P ei = P
p,u
j . EV e then binds its credential τi to the two com-
mitments Cei = Cmt(P
e
i ;R
e
i ) and C
p,u
j = Cmt(P
p,u
j ;R
p,u
j ). Since PO j also
knows the commitment opener Rei and R
p,u
j , it can verify that the EV indeed
binds its credential to the two commitments Cei and C
p,u
j instead of to some
other commitments of different values. Therefore, when the PO relays the
EV’s zero-knowledge proof π to the utility, it is guaranteed that both PO p
and EV e agree on the price P ei = P
p,u
j committed in C
e
i and C
p,u
j . Since the
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PO must relay the zero-knowledge proof π in order for the price validation
protocol to complete, and since the EV and the PO can only obtain their
receipts when the price validation completes, we are guaranteed that for the
charging session (e, p, u, i, j) the price committed in C˜ei of the EV’s receipt
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) must be equal to the price committed in C˜
p,u
j of the PO’s re-
ceipt (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ). By defining f((m
e
i , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i )) = (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) for
each charging session (e, p, u, i, j), we obtain the desired bijective mapping.
We can use the existence of a bijective mapping between receipts and
commitments to prove the correctness of Janus. Janus is correct in the
sense that it allows the utility to verify that P e =
∑Me
i=1 P
e
i for each EV e
and P p,u ≤∑Mp,uj=1 P p,uj for each PO p ∈ P.
We give an indirect proof for the correctness of Janus, which it achieves
using homomorphic commitments that are signed by the utility. Consider
an EV e that during the reconciliation phase submits a total of M e
′
receipts
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) where 1 ≤ i ≤ M e
′
. From the reconciliation phase it is clear
that EV e can only claim a total fee that is equal to the sum of the charging
fees committed in the commitments {C˜ei : 1 ≤ i ≤M}. If the EV attempts
to replace C˜ei with another commitment C
′ = Cmt(P ′;R′) with a different
charging fee P ′ 6= P ei , it must forge the utility’s signature σ′ on (mei , C ′),
which is infeasible given the security of the ACL signature [27]. Since C˜ei is a
commitment of P ei , this guarantees that the claimed total is P
e =
∑Me′
i=1 P
e
i .
Note that, so far there is no guarantee that the number of receipts M e
′
submitted by EV e is equal to the number of charging sessions M e that the
EV actually participated in. To guarantee that M = M e, Janus requires
the EV to reveal all unused credentials during the reconciliation phase. As
discussed previously, this prevents EV e from intentionally omitting one or
multiple individual charging fees in the calculation of the total fee. Given
that P e =
∑Me′
i=1 P
e
i and that M
e′ = M e, we have P e =
∑Me
i=1 P
e
i , which
proves the first part.
The correctness of PO p’s total fee follows a similar argument. PO p
can only claim a total fee that is the sum of a subset of the charging fees
committed in the commitments {C˜p,uj : 1 ≤ j ≤ Mp,u}. The PO cannot
modify the value P p,uj committed in C˜
p,u
j without invalidating the signature
σp,uj on the pair (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j ). The PO has to support its claimed total fee
using a series of receipts (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ). Each receipt proves to the utility
that some EV, whose true identity is unknown to the utility, has agreed on
the fee that is committed in C˜p,uj . The utility can verify that the total fee
claimed by the PO is indeed the sum of all of the fees committed in the
homomorphic commitments C˜p,uj that the PO submits, without learning the
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value of the individual fees themselves, which proves the second part. PO p
can thus claim at most an amount of P p,u =
∑Mp,u
j=1 P
p,u
j .
Note that Janus does not prevent a PO from underclaiming the total
fee, e.g., by intentionally omitting one or more receipts in the calculation
of the total fee. Nonetheless, since in our billing model the PO does not
receive payment directly from the EV but from the utility that aggregates
the dynamic charging activities of the EVs during the past billing cycle,
underlaiming the charging fee would only cause financial damage to the PO.
A rational PO would thus not attempt to underclaim the total charging fee.
6.5.2 Location Privacy
To analyze the location privacy provided by Janus, recall that Janus allows
the utility u to learn (P e,M e) about each contracted EV e, and (P p,u,Mp,u)
about each PO p, but it does not reveal to the utility the fee for each
individual dynamic charging session, neither the charging sections that an
EV has charged its battery at. If a utility has a single EV as customer
then the aggregate information is clearly enough for the utility to invade
the location privacy of the EV, i.e., to infer the charging sections the EV
visited. In what follows we are interested in whether the utility can infer
the set of charging sections that a particular EV visited, and possibly the
fee for each possible charging session of an EV, in more likely scenarios.
For the analysis recall that
∑
e∈E M
e =
∑
p∈P M
p,u = M , and let us
consider a particular outcome of charging sessions of EVs e ∈ E at POs
p ∈ P. We can model this by a bipartite multigraph G = (E ,P,S), where S
is the set of edges, which contains an edge (e, p) for every charging session
of EV e at PO p. Observe that G has parallel edges if any EV had multiple
charging sessions at the same PO.
Without a priori information about the charging fees, inferring the EVs’
location can be formulated as finding the (number of) bipartite multigraphs
(E ,P,S) that satisfy
∑
e∈E
1S((e, p)) = Mp,u ∀p ∈ P (6.6)
∑
p∈P
1S((e, p)) = M e ∀e ∈ E , (6.7)
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and that allow a feasible vector of payments (P(e,p)) to the problem
∑
p∈P
P(e,p) = P
e, ∀e ∈ E (6.8)
∑
(e,p)∈S
P(e,p) = P
p,u. (6.9)
Constraint (6.6) corresponds to the number of charging sessions of PO p,
(6.7) to the number of charging sessions of EV e, (6.8) ensures that the total
fee of each EV is allocated, and (6.8) enforces a feasible allocation of fees
between EVs and POs.
In the worst case every bipartite multigraph that satisfies (6.6) and (6.7)
allows a feasible vector of payments. The following result shows that if each
PO provides charging sessions to sufficiently many EVs then the number of
feasible bipartite graphs grows exponentially.
The number of bipartite graphs that satisfy (6.6)-(6.7) is lower bounded
by (
M
|E||P|
)Ω(|E||P|)
. (6.10)
To obtain the number of bipartite multigraphs satisfying the above con-
straints, let us consider the biadjacency matrix of a bipartite multigraph,
i.e., the non-negative integer valued matrix of size |E|×|P| whose entry (e, p)
is the number of parallel edges between vertices e and p. Every bipartite
multigraph satisfying (6.6) and (6.7) has a biadjacency matrix whose row
sum for row e is M e and column sum for column p is Mp,u. Finding the
feasible bipartite multigraphs is thus equivalent to finding the non-negative
integer valued matrices of size |E|×|P| with row sum sequence (M e)e∈E and
column sum sequence (Mp,u)p∈P . While it is known that a feasible matrix
can be found in polynomial time, counting the number of feasible matrices
is known to be #P-hard even for |E| = 2 [75]. Furthermore, if the matrix
is dense, i.e., mine∈E{M e} = Ω(|P|) and minp∈P{Mp,u} = Ω(|E|), then the
number of bipartite graphs can be lower bounded by [76]
(
M
|E||P| )
Ω(|E||P|). (6.11)
The above result shows that the search space grows exponentially with
both the number of EVs and the number of POs. For example, suppose there
are a total of 104 EVs and 10 POs, and each EV participates in 2 charging
sessions on average per day. Suppose the billing cycle is 30 days, then
there will be a total of M = 6∗105 charging sessions in the billing cycle. To
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consider all feasible bipartite graphs, i.e., which EV visited which PO for how
many times, the utility needs to search in a space of ( 6∗10
5
104∗10 )
Ω(104∗10) ∼ 6105 .
Thus, without a priori information about the charging fees Janus provides
a high level of location privacy when there are sufficiently many EVs and
POs.
To evaluate the case when the utility does have a priori information we
now consider the case when a PO charges the same amount for every charg-
ing session. To consider this case it suffices to introduce the additional
constraint
P(e,p) = P
p,u/Mp,u ∀(e, p) ∈ S, (6.12)
i.e., the fee of a charging session at PO p is always P p,u/Mp,u.
Next we show that the problem of finding a bipartite graph and a feasible
vector of payments that satisfy (6.6)-(6.9) and (6.12) is NP-hard.
It is easy to see that the problem defined by (6.6)-(6.9) and (6.12) corre-
sponds to the sized multiple subset sum problem, which is a generalization
of the sized subset sum problem [77]. The sized subset sum problem consists
of a list of positive integers (the charging fees of the POs, one integer per
charging session), a positive integer P e, and a positive integer parameter
M e. The objective is to decide whethere there is a sublist of size M e of the
integers that sums to P e. The sized subset sum problem is W[1]-hard [77],
i.e., its complexity increases exponentially in the parameter M e, and is ex-
actly the problem of assigning charging sessions that satisfy (6.8) to an EV
e. Since the problem has to be solved for all EVs simultaneously, the prob-
lem (6.6)-(6.9) and (6.12) is a generalization of the sized subset sum problem
and is thus NP-hard.
To summarize, without a priori information it is the number of feasible
bipartite graphs that makes privacy invasion infeasible, while with a priori
information it is the computational complexity. An analysis of the complex-
ity of identifying charging sessions under different priors is a topic on its
own right, and is beyond the scope of this chapter.
6.6 Evaluation
In this seciton we present the evaluation result of Janus.
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Figure 6.5: Execution time of the price validation protocol. EV
preparation and EV validation are run on a Raspberry Pi 2 Model B. PO
preparation and signature generation are run on a Macbook. Error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
6.6.1 Implementation
We have implemented Janus in Python using the petlib library [72], which
includes an implementation of the ACL signature scheme. The implemen-
tation uses Pederson commitment as the homomorphic commitment scheme
and P-224 elliptic curve group. Since the implementation is primarily meant
to evaluate the execution time rather than the communication delay, we im-
plemented the protocols as a single process and simplified message passing
between different entities as function calls.
6.6.2 Execution Time
The Janus protocol consists of 3 phases, but the registration and the rec-
onciliation phases are only executed once per billing cycle, at the beginning
and at the end, and rely only on ACL signatures and homomorphic commit-
ments. The most complex part of the Janus protocol is the price validation
phase shown in Figure 6.4, which is executed at the beginning of each dy-
namic charging session, and thus we focus on the execution time of this
phase. For the evaluation we consider a reasonable scenario in which the
PO and the utility have more computational power than the EV, and thus
we run the EV preparation and the EV validation steps on a Raspberry
Pi 2 Model B, which has a 900MHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A7 CPU and
1GB RAM, and run the PO preparation and the receipt generation steps
on a macbook pro with a 2.7GHz Intel Core i5 and 8 GB RAM. We repeat
the execution for 20 times, and we show the average execution time of the
various steps in Figure 6.5.
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Clearly, the most time-consuming operations are included in the EV prepa-
ration step, where the EV constructs the non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof πe,p,ui,j . The signature generation step, although involving more cryp-
tographic operations, takes less time to execute since the utility and the
PO have more computational power than the EV. Overall the price valida-
tion protocol took less than 0.6 seconds to execute, which makes it practical
for the subscription-based billing model, even if communication delays are
considered.
6.6.3 Communication Overhead
Recall that Janus consists of three phases: registration, price validation, and
reconciliation. Both the registration and the reconciliation phase happen
only once per billing cycle, and the delay constraint on these two phases are
very loose. We therefore are more interested in the communication overhead
of the price validation phase, which happens once per charging session.
The price validation phase involves two instances of ACL signature gen-
eration, each of which involves 5 message exchanges [27]. Nonetheless, the
ACL signature generation algorithm is run by the PO and the utility, hence
the time needed for 5 message exchanges is not significant. We thus treat
ACL signature generation as a blackbox, and refer to [27] for its analysis.
Besides the message exchanges used in the ACL algorithm, the price vali-
dation phase requires only 5 messages. In Table 6.1, we show the sizes of the
messages exchanged in Figure 6.41. The numbers correspond to the sizes of
the actual python objects in our implementation. The two largest messages
are msg 3 and msg 4, which include the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
πe,p,ui,j and the EV’s credential τ
e
i . Recall that the price validation phase dur-
ing which these message exchanges occur happens once per charging session,
their transmission over any reasonable wireless communication system would
incur a small transmission time. These experimental results show that the
computational and communication complexity of Janus make it practical for
dynamic EV charging.
6.6.4 Scalability
In Janus, the EV obtains all its single-use anonymous credentials τ ei from
the utility during the registration phase. Issuing one anonymous creden-
tial requires running the signing algorithm of ACL signature, which is time
1We omitted the message exchanges in the standard ACL signature signing process.
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Message Size (bytes)
msg 1 28
msg 2 180
msg 3 1117
msg 4 1165
msg 5 833
Table 6.1: Message sizes
consuming (e.g., taking around 1 sec to complete). However, this does not
affect the scalability of the protocol because the registration phase happens
once at the beginning of the billing cycle, where the EV has several hours
or even days to obtain all the anonymous credentials it needs. Similarly,
the reconciliation phase also happens once every billing cycle, and does not
affect the real-time scalability of Janus.
6.7 Discussion
To put Janus into a context, we continue with a discussion of topics related
to the design of Janus.
6.7.1 Comparison with Electronic Toll Pricing
If we regard each dynamic charging section as a toll road, then electronic
toll pricing protocols [78, 79, 80] can be used in dynamic charging. However,
to the best of our knowledge, most electronic toll pricing protocols require
random spot checks to combat the malicious behavior where the vehicle
drives through the toll road without running the protocol, e.g., by switch-
ing off the vehicle’s on-board communication device. Random spot check
incur additional maintenance cost, e.g., deployment of patrol cars, and may
also raise fairness issues in certain cases, e.g., short-term rental car service.
Janus does not rely on random spot check at all to detect payment omis-
sion. One important difference between the scenario of dynamic charging
and that of electronic toll pricing is that, in electronic toll pricing, even if
the vehicle does not own the proper authorization and does not authenticate
itself, it can still drive on the toll road segment (unless there is a physical
gate enforcing proper payment before entry). To combat driving on toll
roads without proper authentication and payment, plate-reading cameras
could capture the plate number of violating vehicles and the driver would
be responsible for paying a fine. However, in the dynamic charging scenario,
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authentication between the EV and the charging pads must complete before
the EV’s battery can be charged. If the EV chooses to turn off its communi-
cation device and does not authenticate with the charging pads, but simply
drives through the dynamic charging section, it is not a violation because
the charging pads will simply not charge the EV’s battery, and there is no
loss for either the pad owners or the utility. Janus utilizes the fact that the
EV must authenticate itself before battery charging, and effectively binds
authentication with payment: the EV must first prove to the pad owner
its authorization by spending the single-use anonymous credential obtained
from the utility. The anonymous credentials serve as both an authentication
token and a binding of the dynamic charging fee to the payment token.
6.7.2 Comparison with Direct Billing Model using Digital Cash
An alternative billing model for dynamic charging might be for the EV to
directly pay the PO using digital cash for each dynamic charging session.
Anonymous digital cash such as Zerocoin [81] or Zerocash [82] can be used
to implement the financial transaction between the EV and the PO. One
might argue that, given the possibility of digital cash, it is not necessary to
have billing protocol for the subscription-based billing model.
One drawback of using digital cash under the direct billing model is that
the EV must pre-load funds into its account and make sure that the account
has sufficient balance before entering the charging section, and the EV may
thus run out of funds at inconvenient times. This problem does not exist in
the subscription-based billing model that Janus is designed for, where the
EV does not need to pre-load funds, and makes the actual payment only at
the end of the billing cycle.
Note that the subscription-based billing model and the direct billing model
described above are not mutually exclusive. Just like a store may accept both
credit card and cash payment, a PO may accept both direct payment using
digital cash and indirect payment using Janus. It is thus important to clarify
the distinct advantages provided by the subscription-based billing model.
The subscription-based billing model, however, enables flexible pricing plans
that are not provided by the direct billing model, e.g., the EV can purchase
a plan of 1000 miles from the utility and use dynamic charging anywhere
anytime to recharge its battery up to 1000 miles of total driving distance.
We also note that Janus is designed specifically for dynamic charging
scenarios, whereas digital cash is designed for more general scenarios, and
thus there are certain features that a digital cash scheme can provide but
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Janus cannot. For example, a digital coin can be transferred multiple times
among different entities, whereas in Janus the EV can only spend a creden-
tial τ once, and can only spend it with the utility. Nonetheless, because of
the generality that digital cash aims to provide, it generally involves more
complex designs than Janus. Anonymous digital cash designs may require
even more complex cryptographic operations or zero-knowledge proofs to
guarantee anonymity during spending. This may result in longer execu-
tion time of digital cash operations. For example, the Zerocash [82] design
involves a zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge
(zk-SNARKs) that takes more than 2 minutes to generate on a platform
with Intel Core i7-2620M 2.7GHz CPU and 12GB RAM. In comparison,
the zero-knowledge proof π used by Janus takes less than 0.4 seconds to
generate on the portable Raspberry Pi 2 platform with significantly less
computational power (900MHz CPU and 1GB RAM).
6.7.3 Trust relationship between EV, Pad Owner, and the Utility
We finally discuss our assumption concerning the trust relationship between
the EV, the PO, and the utility. Our billing model is a subscription-based
model, in that the EV subscribes to the utility and receives a monthly bill
aggregating all its dynamic charging usage from the utility. This requires the
EV to trust the utility to make the correct calculation. In Janus, since the
EV knows the ground truth of the dynamic charging fee for each charging
session, it can easily verify if the total price in the monthly bill is correct. The
utility can verify that the EV does not omit any payment token, and each
payment token is authorized by some PO. However, the trust relationship
between the EV and the utility does not automatically imply that the EV
should give up its location privacy to the utility. Janus protects the EV’s
location privacy by not allowing the utility to infer the fee of a particular
individual charging session from the payment tokens submitted by the EV.
To a certain extent, Janus assumes more trust relationship between the
EV and the PO. This is reflected in the design where the PO effectively
acts as a proxy between the EV and the utility: the EV does not directly
communicate with the utility during the price validation phase; instead, the
PO relays the credentials of the EV to the utility and the payment token
from the utility to the EV. We justify this design choice by the observation
that the PO is able to physically observe the EV. By our definition, the
PO operates the dynamic charging section, and if the EV drives over the
dynamic charging section, the corresponding PO inevitably observes the
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EV. We thus argue that the billing protocol, which works within the cyber
space, cannot prevent the PO from revealing the EV’s location and identity
to any other entity in the physical space, and the billing protocol must
assume that the PO will not reveal the EV’s location information. As a
consequence, mechanisms are needed to discourage a PO from revealing the
EV’s identity and location to a third party, whether or not Janus is used.
The design of such mechanisms is outside of the scope of the chapter.
6.7.4 Charging Fee Negotiation
Janus assumes that the EV and the PO are able to negotiate charging fees
for each dynamic charging session. The problem of charging fee negotiation
is orthogonal to the problem space of Janus, whose major goal is to al-
low verifiable aggregation of per-session charging fee into total charging fee
without compromising the EV’s location privacy. The EV and the PO may
negotiate charging fee for the incoming dynamic charging session according
to various pricing policies, e.g., fixed-rate pricing, day-ahead pricing, real-
time pricing, etc., and the exact policy and negotiation protocol used by the
EV and the PO is not our concern in this chapter.
Janus requires the EV and the PO to negotiate charging fee and complete
the price validation phase prior to the charging. Note that once the price
validation phase completes, the PO already obtains the receipt that it can
use to claim money from the utility. In particular, a malicious PO may com-
plete price validation with the EV but refuses to charge the EV. One might
suggest that the PO should first charge the EV’s battery, and only after the
dynamic charging finishes do they run the price validation phase. However,
this alternative design choice would allow a malicious EV to freeride the
dynamic charging service by simply not running the price validation phase
after it has received electricity from the PO. The question of whether price
validation should complete before or after the actual charging is thus re-
lated to the question whether the EV or the PO is more likely to behave
maliciously. We made the design choice where the EV and the PO com-
plete price validation before the actual charging for the following reasons:
(i) this is consistent with our assumption that the EV fully trusts the PO;
(ii) a malicious PO is more likely to be caught, since the dynamic charging
section is a physical road segment that does not move, and if the PO is
reported of behaving maliciously, e.g., not charging the EV’s battery after
price validation completes, the utility or some other authority could send
their own EVs to collect evidence; and (iii) in the scenario where multiple
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POs co-exist in the area and compete with each other, a PO not honoring
the negotiated charging amount is likely to lose customers.
Another advantage of having the EV complete price validation phase with
the PO prior to charging is authentication. Recall that in the price validation
phase, EV e must spend a single-use anonymous credential τ ei . The PO is
able to verify that the credential is spent correctly, which in turn tells the
PO that this EV is valid and indeed subscribes to the utility. If the EV
fails to spend an unused anonymous credential, the PO considers the EV as
unauthenticated and will simply not charge the EV’s battery at all.
6.8 Related Work
Several works have been proposed to use modern cryptography to improve
privacy of electronic toll pricing service [78, 79, 80]. One common feature
shared by these designs is that the vehicle is required to periodically broad-
cast certain information that can be used later by the authority to calculate
its bill. The challenge is to make sure that the information disclosed during
the periodic broadcast and the bill calculation process do not violate the
vehicle’s location privacy. In VPriv [78] the vehicle periodically broadcasts
tags whose commitment the vehicle has registered with the authority. To
calculate the bill, the authority sends to the vehicle the prices associated
with each tag that the authority has received from any vehicle, and the
vehicle calculates the total price using the prices corresponding to its own
tags. The authority and the vehicle then engage in a two-party protocol
where the vehicle proves either of the following: i) the tags used in the
calculation are valid; or ii) the total price is calculated correctly with re-
spect to the tags. The two-party protocol can be executed multiple times
to improve the authority’s confidence that the vehicle’s bill is calculated
correctly. Unlike VPriv, PrETP [79] does not use two-party computations.
Instead, the vehicle periodically broadcasts a homomorphic commitment of
the price corresponding to the current road segment. During the bill cal-
culation phase, the authority combines all the individual commitment of
the vehicle to obtian a commitment of the total fee; the vehicle calculates
the total fee and proves to the authority that it knows the opening to the
commitment of the total fee. To guarantee that an EV would faithfully
broadcast the information required by the protocol, both VPriv and PrETP
rely on random spot checks, and if the vehicle is physically observed at cer-
tain time and location, the vehicle is responsible for providing the proof that
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the toll price corresponding to that time and location is included in the total
fee correctly. Milo [80] improves PrETP by considering the possibility that
multiple vehicles collude and share the location of random spot checks with
each other, and uses blind identity-based encryption to guarantee that the
vehicles would not be able to learn these random spot check locations. In
Spectre [83], the vehicle is given certain amount of Chaum’s e-cash [84] as
tokens, and periodically broadcast tokens while driving (each token can be
spent only once). At the end of the billing cycle, the vehicle submits all
unused tokens, and pay for the tokens spent on the road. The drawback
shared by VPriv, PrETP, Milo, and Spectre is that they all rely on random
spot checks to guarantee that the vehicle is following the protocol faithfully.
The random spot check incurs additional cost for the authority, and to some
degree violates the vehicle’s location privacy as well.
Privacy-preserving billing has also been proposed for other transportation
scenarios. Liu et al. [85] proposed a privacy-preserving billing scheme with
revocation for static charging of electric vehicles based on the BBS+ signa-
ture [86]. The static charging scenario, where an EV stops at a charging
station to charge its battery, is quite different from dynamic charging where
an EV charges its battery while moving on the road. Kerschbaum et al. [87]
proposed a privacy-preserving billing mechanism for public transportation
(e.g., subway or bus). The scenario in [87] assumes that the user must tap
a special cash card at the gate before entering or exiting the transporta-
tion system, and that the user will add value to the cash card at a special
machine from time to time.
6.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented Janus, a privacy-preserving billing pro-
tocol for dynamic charging of electric vehicles. By using blind signatures
with attributes and homomorphic commitments, Janus allows the utility to
verify that the total payment of the individual EVs and the total fee that
the PO should receive are calculated correctly, without learning the dynamic
charging fee of each individual charging session. Our python-based imple-
mentation indicates that the most real-time price validation phase of Janus
can complete within 0.6 seconds.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Dynamic charging is a promising technology for future electrified transporta-
tion. By allowing electric vehicles (EVs) to charge their batteries while
moving, dynamic charging potentially increases the driving range of EVs
and reduces the battery size and in turn the total price of the EV. However,
dynamic charging is also sensitive to the variation of physical parameters
such as the EV’s speed, alignment, and the airgap between the charging
pad and the EV, etc. Cyber infrastructure support is a pre-requisite in or-
der for the charging pads to learn the necessary charging parameters before
charging the incoming EV’s battery. Since the messages exchanged between
the EV and the charging facilities may contain sensitive information such
as the EV’s current battery State-of-Charge (which can be used to infer
the EV’s past locations), the cyber infrastructure must provide secure and
privacy-preserving authentication and communication for dynamic charging.
Towards this end we have presented two protocols: FADEC and Portunes.
FADEC is a general V2I authentication protocol that allows EVs to effi-
ciently authenticate with a series of roadside units (RSUs). FADEC adopts
a proactive key dissemination approach to achieve seamless authentication
handoff, and allows the EV to authenticate with a sequence of RSUs with-
out re-negotiating the session key. Portunes is an authentication protocol
specifically for the dynamic charging scenario, where the EV must authenti-
cate with charging pads at high frequency (e.g., once every 30 milliseconds).
Portunes adopts a key pre-distribution approach, where the computation-
ally intensive parts of the protocol such as key generation and distribution
are performed during the night when most EVs are parked. This allow
EVs to authenticate with charging pads using only lightweight symmetric
cryptographic operations. We described Janus, a privacy-preserving billing
protocol for the subscription-based billing model, where the EV receives a
single bill from the utility that aggregates all its dynamic charging activities
in the past billing cycle. Janus takes advantage of modern cryptographic
building blocks such as blind signature with attributes, and allows the util-
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ity to verify the correctness of the EV’s bill without learning the time and
location of each dynamic charging session of the EV, which preserves the
EV’s location privacy. Our evaluation results based on simulations and im-
plementations indicate that FADEC, Portunes, and Janus are efficient and
practical for future dynamic charging applications.
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